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The Future of HIPAA in the Cloud 
Abstract 
This white paper examines how cloud computing generates new privacy 
challenges for both healthcare providers and patients, and how American 
health privacy laws may be interpreted or amended to address these 
challenges. Given the current implementation of Meaningful Use rules for 
health information technology and the Omnibus HIPAA Rule in health 
care generally, the stage is now set for a distinctive law of “health 
information” to emerge.  HIPAA has come of age of late, with more 
aggressive enforcement efforts targeting wayward healthcare providers 
and entities.  Nevertheless, more needs to be done to assure that health 
privacy and all the values it is meant to protect are actually vindicated in 
an era of ever faster and more pervasive data transfer and analysis. 
After describing how cloud computing is now used in healthcare, this 
white paper examines nascent and emerging cloud applications.  Current 
regulation addresses many of these scenarios, but also leaves some 
important decision points ahead.  Business associate agreements between 
cloud service providers and covered entities will need to address new 
risks.  To meaningfully consent to new uses of protected health 
information, patients will need access to more sophisticated and granular 
methods of monitoring data collection, analysis, and use. Policymakers 
should be concerned not only about medical records, but also about 
medical reputations used to deny opportunities.  In order to implement 
these and other recommendations, more funding for technical assistance 
for health privacy regulators is essential. 
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The Future of HIPAA in the Cloud 
Frank Pasquale & Tara Adams Ragone1 
I.  Introduction 
Corporations are increasingly turning to cloud computing solutions 
for storage, communication, and analytical needs. The logic of specialization is irresistible for 
many. Outsource information technology (IT) to a third party, and let it worry about security, 
deduplication, archiving, backup, and other critical issues.  
The cloud has its dangers, to be sure—outages may be rarer, but more devastating when 
they do occur, given the centralization of storage and related services.  This centralization of data 
also makes cloud providers a target for hackers.  But the logic of efficiency and specialization is 
compelling.2 Just as Amazon effectively consolidated the business of thousands of individual 
book retailers into a single platform, some futurists envision a mass migration of business 
records to a small number of cloud service providers.  
Whatever their merits in other areas of business, cloud models have come under scrutiny 
when used in the healthcare arena. Patients are rightly concerned about critical health data being 
lost or inappropriately accessed.3  On the one hand, cloud service providers may reduce those 
risks by deploying their unique expertise. On the other hand, the more entities access data, the 
more chances there are for something to go wrong. Risks along many dimensions—legal, 
reputational, medical, among others—need to be addressed. 
This white paper examines one particular dimension of that risk: dangers to health 
privacy interests caused by inappropriate data access, storage, transmission, or analysis. The 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) and the Health Information 
Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act (HITECH) provide a general framework of 
federal law to help deter and reduce the likelihood that such issues will occur; state laws often 
                                                          
1 Pasquale is Schering-Plough Professor in Health Care Regulation and Enforcement at Seton Hall Law School.  
Ragone is Research Fellow and Lecturer in Law at Seton Hall Law School and its Center for Health & 
Pharmaceutical Law & Policy.  We would like to thank the Center for Health & Pharmaceutical Law & Policy and 
Microsoft Corporation for sponsoring this research.  We also wish to thank Melissa Goldstein, Melissa Markey, Bill 
Pewen, and Nicolas Terry for commenting on the white paper. 
2 See, e.g., Michael Hugos & Derek Hulitzky, BUSINESS IN THE CLOUD: WHAT EVERY BUSINESS NEEDS TO KNOW 
ABOUT CLOUD COMPUTING (2010) (describing the factors “driving business to the cloud and away from corporate 
data centers,” including that “cloud computing enables clearer focus on the business,” “cloud computing reduces 
dependence on internal infrastructure and the capital expense that goes with that infrastructure,” “cloud computing 
automatically scales up and down with business volume, and this variable cost operating model reduces financial 
risks,” “in-house systems can be migrated to the cloud with relative ease if the process is well designed,” and “cloud 
computing . . . allow[s] customers to buy only what they consume”).   
3 Gina Stevens, CONG. RESEARCH. SERV., RL34120, FEDERAL INFORMATION SECURITY AND DATA BREACH 
NOTIFICATION LAWS (2010); Lucas Mearian, ‘Wall of Shame’ Exposes 21M Medical Record Breaches, 
COMPUTERWORLD (Aug. 7, 2012), http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9230028.   
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reinforce those patient protections.4  After years of being dismissed as a toothless tiger, HIPAA 
has come of age of late, with more aggressive enforcement efforts targeting wayward healthcare 
providers, payers, and other covered entities.5  Nevertheless, more needs to be done to assure 
that health privacy and all the values it is meant to protect are actually vindicated in an era of 
cloud computing, given the ever faster and more pervasive data transfer and analysis that 
technological change is now bringing to the healthcare sector. 
This white paper surveys some important areas in health privacy regulation and data 
protection standards.  After describing how cloud computing is now used in healthcare, it 
examines nascent and emerging cloud applications (Part II).  Current regulation addresses many 
of these scenarios but also leaves some important decision points ahead (Part III).  The white 
paper offers some recommendations for future policy, reflecting the concerns of diverse U.S. 
stakeholders and lessons from both state law and international policy (Part IV).  It concludes 
with some reflections on the clash of cultures between the healthcare sector and the Silicon 
Valley giants now dominating the cloud (Part V). 
II.  The Role of Cloud Computing in Healthcare 
A.  How Cloud Computing Is Now Used in Healthcare 
Virtually every healthcare provider, health plan and healthcare clearinghouse has used 
information technology, if only for revenue cycle management. The diffusion of electronic health 
records (EHRs) has now reached a critical mass, assuring that more healthcare entities are 
dealing with digitized records of protected health information (PHI).  Meaningful use regulations 
soon will also move from “carrot” to “stick,” taking a bite out of Medicare reimbursements for 
eligible healthcare providers who fail to get on the digitization bandwagon. 
Traditionally, healthcare providers have invested in desktop computers, servers, routers, 
and storage devices on site.6  They have also licensed software, which is installed onsite.  The 
                                                          
4 The Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act (HITECH) is Title VIII of the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (“ARRA”), Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115, 226-79 (2009) 
(codified in various sections of 42 U.S.C.).  The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services’ (HHS) Office for 
Civil Rights (OCR) is responsible for enforcing the Privacy and Security Rules promulgated under the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). The Privacy Rule protects the privacy of individually 
identifiable health information, while the Security Rule sets national standards for the security of electronic 
protected health information. HIPAA applies to covered entities and business associates, as defined in 45 C.F.R. § 
160.103. 
5 See, e.g., Mary Anne Pazanowski, HHS Breaks New Ground with $43 Million Penalty for HIPAA Privacy Rule 
Violation, 20 HEALTH LAW REPORTER 277 (BNA) (Feb. 24, 2011). 
6 Third party EHR vendors come in many varieties.  Attorney Michael J. Daray describes two general competing 
models of EHR vendors.  See Michael Daray, Negotiating Electronic Health Record Technology Agreements, 22 
No. 2 Health Law 53 (2009).  The “traditional model” involves a healthcare provider acquiring a license in EHR 
software from a third party vendor.  The software is then installed on the physician’s computer hardware or network, 
and patient data is then stored on the physician’s premises.  The advantage to this model is that the physician retains 
control over the data, but cost can be a downside.  Id. at 54. 
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healthcare provider, as a buyer of hardware and software licensee, has had the responsibility to 
coordinate these systems and to optimize their utilization and management.  An on-site IT 
infrastructure can be costly and hard to manage, especially in comparison to specialized cloud 
service providers.  Healthcare professionals have enough difficulty keeping up with the newest 
medical research and applying it to their care settings; understanding the latest trends in IT (even 
if deciphered and presented by a dedicated IT staff) may prove to be a task few are well-qualified 
for. Further, the increasing emphasis on health IT has created a significant dearth of well-
qualified health IT staff, placing such staff largely outside the grasp of smaller healthcare 
providers such as physician offices.  Many healthcare providers, particularly physicians, clinics, 
and stand-alone hospitals, do not want the responsibility of owning and managing hardware and 
software for electronic health records, practice management, and revenue cycle management.   
Early steps toward the modern cloud computing paradigm offered another alternative. 
The use of browser-based applications and data centers became of particular interest to 
healthcare providers.  As internet connectivity became more pervasive and reliable for many 
commercial entities, the ability to run applications remotely became a reality.  The availability of 
software through hosted solutions, such as "Software as a Service" ("SaaS"), allows the 
investment in hardware and hosting services to be made by the vendor, while the healthcare 
provider's investment is limited to subscription payments.  The users do not own hardware or 
software, other than the machines used locally to access the SaaS vendor.7  Rather, they are often 
                                                          
7 Generally, a cloud service provider manages information on behalf of (or regarding) another entity.   There are 
several different service models for storing information in the cloud.  First, the EHR vendor may use the SaaS model 
discussed above to allow customers to access the software on a cloud infrastructure, with the cloud provider 
responsible for the software.  See H. Ward Classen, Cloudy with A Chance of Rain: Avoiding Pitfalls in Cloud 
Computing, 45 MD. B.J. 18, 20 (2012).  Second, the Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) model allows customers to 
access data held on the cloud through the internet with their own software.  Id.  Third, the Business Process as a 
Service (BPaaS) model allows customers to access an entire business on the cloud, such as billing.  Id.  In the fourth 
model, Platform as a Service (PaaS), “the cloud vendor provides all of the services provided in IAAS, but also 
provides the operating system and storage and network capacity management.  . . . Essentially, the customer has 
outsourced to the cloud vendor full data center operations, while retaining applications-level responsibilities, 
including maintenance of databases, patch administration, and similar activities.” Melissa Markey, Esq. & Margaret 
Marchak, Esq., “Chapter 15: Security Considerations in Technology Contracting,” at 19 (draft chapter on file with 
authors).  Melissa Markey reports that Security as a Service (SecaaS) is another model that has been gaining 
popularity. See Notes from Melissa Markey, Esq. (on file with authors). SecaaS, which is a segment of the SaaS 
market, permits customers to outsource security management over the internet, including services such as anti-virus 
and anti-malware. See “Introduction to Security as a Service,” Cloud Security Alliance, 
https://cloudsecurityalliance.org/research/secaas/ (last visited May 20, 2013); “Definition: Security as a Service 
(SaaS),” SearchSecurity, http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/definition/Security-as-a-Service (last visited May 20, 
2013).   As Markey and Marchak point out, the different models involve varying levels of control over software and 
hardware, which affects what contract terms may be appropriate to address responsibility for data security: 
 
[T]he relative degree of control over the environment, both hardware and 
software, vary significantly depending on the service model procured by the 
customer.  In IAAS, the cloud vendor has control of the physical environment 
and hardware, and thus should be contractually obligated to implement 
reasonable security controls over related risk areas.  Because the customer has 
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paying for access to the SaaS programs and/or for new computational capabilities, and all the 
accompanying data processing and assistance that implies.8  Use of SaaS solutions permitted 
healthcare providers to invest in more technology, as the need for capital investment in hardware 
decreased, thus developing richer data sets.  As this model matures, moving beyond native 
applications to more collaborative platforms can lead to co-creation of value (as in, say, 
concurrent or shared access by both primary care and specialist physicians to a record set). 
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has defined cloud computing 
as “a model for enabling convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable 
computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that can be 
rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service provider 
interaction.”9  If cloud computing were merely a form of IT outsourcing, it might not be worthy 
of much legal note.  The contractual arrangements and laws of agency surrounding such 
outsourcing processes are well-established.  Rather, cloud computing services involve new 
innovations in both technology and business models that create new opportunities—and perils—
for healthcare providers and contractors alike.10  
Moreover, there are unique issues in the healthcare industry that can make the 
implementation of cloud computing more of a challenge.11  As A.K. Soman observes,  
The Healthcare industry is however different from most other 
industry verticals. Healthcare data is highly sensitive—any breach 
of privacy and security in the context of healthcare data can have 
serious consequences. Secondly, there are multiple entities that 
have to deal with healthcare data. This includes care providers, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
control over the operating system and applications, the customer must accept 
greater responsibility for security with respect to those elements.  The opposite 
is true, however, for SAAS implementations, wherein the cloud provider should 
be contractually obligated to implement reasonable security controls for the 
entire environment. 
 
Markey & Marchak, supra note 7, at 20. 
8 In SaaS, the physician subscribes to the software that is remotely hosted on a server, and uploads patient data that 
is stored on that server.   Given the use of technology here, “concerns aris[e] if the vendor ceases business 
operations.”  Bulletin, American College of Surgeons, at 
http://www.facs.org/fellows_info/bulletin/negotiatingehr.html.  For this reason, the contract with the cloud provider 
must address data back up and provide a clear right to data if the contract expires or terminates.  See Markey & 
Marchak, supra note 7, at 34; Notes from Melissa Markey, Esq. (on file with authors). Data ownership and limited 
rights of use clauses may also help clarify expectations in such scenarios. 
9 National Institute of Standards and Technology, Cloud Computing, at http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SNS/cloud-
computing/.   
10 Delivery models for the cloud infrastructure itself come in four varieties: public, private, hybrid, or community.  
See Classen, supra note 7, at 20-21.   
11 Chris Preimesberger, Storing Health Records in the Cloud: Ten Reasons Why It’s a Bad Idea, 
http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Data-Storage/Storing-Health-Records-in-the-Cloud-10-Reasons-Why-Its-a-Bad-Idea-
290388/ (Aug. 17, 2010) (but note that the key source for the story is the founder of a client/server-based health-care 
record software maker). 
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hospital administration staff, payers, labs, [and] patients 
themselves. There are extensive regulations governing the 
healthcare industry and many of these regulations impact the 
nature of the information technology solutions adopted by the 
industry. The fact that cloud based solutions are being reliably 
used in other industry segments does not automatically imply that 
they can be used in the healthcare industry.12 
 
Nevertheless, cloud-based practice management software has taken on such sensitive issues as 
patient account management, managing patients, HIPAA compliance, patient portals,13 and 
appointment scheduling.14  Cloud-based ePrescription systems may also help providers meet 
HIPAA’s meaningful use requirements.15  Whether the preceding functionalities (of practice 
management, revenue cycle management, or EHRs) are cloud-based or not, a healthcare provider 
might choose to back up its system in the cloud using a web storage service—or its contractors 
may choose to do so.   
Cloud services suffer from certain vulnerabilities.  For example, cloud services are at the 
mercy of internet access.  Prolonged internet outages, such as recently experienced during 
Hurricane Sandy, create real risks that healthcare providers will not be able to access critical 
information when it is most needed.16  Privacy is also a renewed concern, as breaches of massive 
databases, even if they are less likely to occur than scattered breaches, are far more menacing to 
privacy and security.17 
                                                          
12  A.K. Soman, CLOUD-BASED SOLUTIONS FOR HEALTHCARE IT, 84 (2011).  
13 Such portals can include functionality to “1) Schedule new appointments or modify previously scheduled 
appointments with the care provider; 2) Register or complete any forms (including medical history) online …; 3) 
Send messages to physicians or ask questions, 4) Request prescription medication refills; 5) Review billing 
information and make payments online; 6) Review further educational information pertaining to their condition.”  
Id. at 94. 
14 Id. at 92. 
15 Id. at 95 (“An ePrescription system is a computerized system in which the prescription is either entered by the 
physician/nurse practitioner or generated on the basis of data available to the system. The prescription can be 
automatically communicated to pharmacies associated with the healthcare provider.”).   
16 Compare discussion in Foley & Lardner LLP, Cloud Computing for Health Care Organizations (2012).  Foley & 
Lardner recommend explicitly mapping out the “mission criticality” of aspects of a cloud service before committing 
to it.  Id. at 5.  On the other hand, “Datacenters are typically located in places where the risk of natural disasters 
(such as earthquakes, floods, hurricanes, etc) and man-made disasters (such as riots, explosions, etc.) is minimal. 
They are located in places with abundant availability of resources such as water and electricity.”  SOMAN, supra note 
12, at 75. 
17 Designers of cloud computing services are taking this risk into account.  See, e.g., Siani Pearson, Taking Account 
of Privacy when Designing Cloud Computing Services § 3.1 (Hewlett Packard Labs., HPL-2009-54, 2009), 
http://www.hpl.hp.com/techreports/2009/HPL-2009-54.pdf; Microsoft Private Cloud Computing; Miranda Mowbray 
& Siani Pearson, A Client-Based Privacy Manager for Cloud Computing, 4 Proc. Int'l ICST Conf. on Comm. Sys. 
Software & Middleware 5, § 1 (2009).  Some experts note the appeal of “private cloud” computing, given these 
concerns.  SOMAN, supra note 12, at 77 (“The Private Cloud entails incurring the cost disadvantages associated with 
in-house IT, since you have to put up the entire infrastructure for the use of your organization alone. On the other 
hand the benefit of the Private Cloud is the security it offers. The Private Cloud is subject to the policies of the 
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Cloud systems thus offer a significant number of tradeoffs.  In exchange for control and 
ownership, users are offered expertise.  Yet it is important not to overstate the change here. In 
many ways the users never really “owned” the software they operated—it was licensed.  The 
EHR literature abounds with worries and complaints from providers that they were “locked into” 
a certain software system.  If they contractually promote platform-independence and data 
portability, some cloud services may help alleviate such concerns.  But they also raise a whole 
new set of issues. 
B.  Nascent and Future Applications of Cloud Computing 
 
 Both cutting edge providers and informed patients are likely to demand more cloud 
computing services (or at least connectivity and interoperability with them) in the future, 
especially as self-tracking devices proliferate.18  As the possibilities of big data analysis inform 
the development of health information technology, the computational prowess of centralized and 
remote IT providers becomes particularly important.19  Several nascent and emerging 
applications of computation in healthcare suggest the intensification of this trend.20 
 Over a decade ago, David Eddy was using a computer model, Archimedes, to model 
human drug trials.21  The American Diabetes Association asked him to project how well a given 
drug was likely to work, based on extant information in his databases and models based on past 
experiences with similar compounds. Now, similar technology can be repurposed to identify 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
organization, just as its operation is under the organization’s control. Therefore, data really never ‘leaves’ your 
premises. This addresses the key concern pertaining to (public) Cloud services, namely, control over the data.”).  
18 Emily Singer, The Measured Life, MIT TECH. REV., July/Aug. 2011, available at 
http://www.technologyreview.com/featured-story/424390/the-measured-life/ (“The new generation of devices rely 
on inexpensive, low-power wireless transceivers that can automatically send data to the wearer’s cell phone or 
computer.  Compared with the limited snapshot of health that is captured during an annual visit to the doctor’s 
office, these tools and techniques could reveal the measures of someone’s health in context, and with a much richer 
resolution.”).   
19 Viktor Mayer-Schonberger & Kenneth Cukier, BIG DATA: A REVOLUTION THAT WILL CHANGE THE WAY WE 
LIVE, WORK, AND THINK (2013) (discussing three key characteristics of the new opportunities in data: “more” data 
is available, and while it’s “messier” than prior data sets, that doesn’t matter in an era when “correlations rather than 
causation” are the key desiderata of analysts); see also Chris Anderson, The End of Theory, WIRED (2008), available 
at http://www.wired.com/science/discoveries/magazine/16-07/pb_theory (“This is a world where massive amounts 
of data and applied mathematics replace every other tool that might be brought to bear. Out with every theory of 
human behavior, from linguistics to sociology. Forget taxonomy, ontology, and psychology. Who knows why 
people do what they do? The point is they do it, and we can track and measure it with unprecedented fidelity. With 
enough data, the numbers speak for themselves.”).   
20 Of course, one should be wary of overestimating the impact of these trends.  See, e.g., Nicolas P. Terry, 
Information Technology’s Failure to Disrupt Health Care, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2118653 (examining “four possible explanations for the 
difficulties faced by HIT in disrupting health care”).    
21 Jennifer Kahn, Modeling Human Drug Trials--Without the Humans, WIRED, Dec. 2009, at 156, 157, 194, 
available at http://www.wired.com/magazine/2009/11/ff_archimedes/all/ (“In early 2004 . . . the American Diabetes 
Association asked a physician and mathematician named David Eddy to run his own . . . trial [on atorvastatin].  He 
would do it, though, without human test subjects, instead using a computer model he had designed called 
Archimedes.”).   
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optimal treatment approaches to particular cases.  For example, there is growing excitement 
about the use of advanced computing systems in clinical decision support.  The partnership 
between IBM and Memorial Sloan-Kettering Hospital is one of the most noted of these 
developments.22  By integrating medical records, treatment guides, public research, and private 
insight, “Watson-like” technology may be able to assist physicians in assessing treatment 
options.  Given the appeal of new technologies to patients, and the increasing difficulty for 
physicians to maintain currency in new developments and consider all of the possible diagnoses 
for each patient, we are likely to see widespread demand for this type of clinical decision support 
in many treatment areas. 
 It will also be tempting for the giants behind public and hybrid cloud computing 
platforms to begin to study the correlations emerging in massive data stores.  Geoffrey Miller 
recently commented on the extraordinary divergence in the research capacities of academics 
(who are often hamstrung by IRB requirements) and large internet companies (which face no 
similar hurdles).23  Researchers have already demonstrated that big data-enabled 
pharmacovigilance might reveal problems sooner than ordinary adverse event reporting 
systems.24   
 Sharona Hoffman and Andy Podgurski’s article, Improving Health Care Outcomes 
through Personalized Comparisons of Treatment Effectiveness Based on Electronic Health 
Records, gives a taste of future applications that patients may demand to optimize their 
healthcare. They have detailed how personalized programs of research on effectiveness could 
work:   
 
We propose the development of a broadly accessible framework to 
enable physicians to rapidly perform, through a computerized 
service, medically sound personalized comparisons of the 
effectiveness of possible treatments for patients’ conditions.  A 
personalized comparison of treatment effectiveness . . . for a given 
patient (the subject patient) would be based on data from EHRs of 
a cohort of patients who are similar to the subject patient 
                                                          
22 Jonah Comstock, IBM’s Watson Interns at Memorial Sloan Kettering, MOBIHEALTHNEWS, available at 
http://mobihealthnews.com/20255/ibms-watson-interns-at-memorial-sloan-kettering/ (“shows how Watson might 
help an oncologist diagnose and treat a cancer patient”).   
23 Geoffrey Miller, N=Billions: The Smartphone Revolution in the Behavioral Sciences, Berkman Center (Mar. 12, 
2013), available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/events/luncheon/2013/03/miller (“Smartphones will empower 
behavioral scientists to collect terabytes of ecologically valid data from vast global samples – easily, quickly, and 
remotely.  Smartphones can record where people are, what they are doing, and what they can see and hear. They can 
run interactive surveys, tests, and experiments through touch screens and Bluetooth peripherals.”).   
24 Ryen White, et al., Web-scale Pharmacovigilance: Listening to Signals from the Crowd, JAMIA (Jan. 13, 2013), 
available at http://jamia.bmj.com/content/early/2013/02/05/amiajnl-2012-001482.abstract  (“The results 
demonstrate that logs of the search activities of populations of computer users can contribute to drug safety 
surveillance.”).    
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(clinically, demographically, genetically), who received the 
treatments previously and whose outcomes were recorded.25 
 
As they explain, such a database query could identify, “for a given patient, an appropriate 
reference group (cohort) of similar, previously treated patients whose EHRs would be analyzed 
to choose the optimal treatment for the patient at issue.”26  Research has already demonstrated 
that pharmacogenetic algorithms can outperform algorithms that consider only clinical factors.27 
 
 The President’s Committee Advising on Science & Technology (PCAST) has also 
endorsed aggressive use of health data to ensure new research opportunities.28  The PCAST 
authors conclude that many clinical research studies today are “out of date before they are even 
finished,” “burdensome and costly,” and too narrowly focused.29  They endorse health 
information technology that is enabled for “syndromic surveillance,” “public health monitoring,” 
and “adverse event monitoring” by aggregating observational data.30 
 
 Efthimios Parasidis also describes how the development of health information technology 
infrastructures in the United States can enable forms of surveillance that are more rigorous, 
comprehensive, and actionable in the world of policy and more user-friendly for patients.31  As 
he observes, “EHR systems now permit advanced data-entry options such as ‘free text [entry], 
templated data entry, dictation, speech recognition, and freehand graphic input.’”32  Rather than 
getting between doctor and patient, advanced EHR stands poised to silently monitor and improve 
their relationship.33  The same record systems that are designed to digitize health diagnoses and 
interventions can also generate outcome data if they are configured appropriately.  Such data 
would help ensure patients and authorities are truly informed about the risks and benefits of 
drugs.34  A complete record of “demographics, progress notes, vital signs, medical history, 
immunization history, and laboratory and radiological reports” can contribute greatly to 
                                                          
25 Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, Improving Health Care Outcomes through Personalized Comparisons of 
Treatment Effectiveness Based on Electronic Health Records, 39 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 425, 425 (2011).   
26 Id. at 426; see also INST. OF MED., CHALLENGES FOR THE FDA: THE FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY 52 (2007), 
available at http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=11969) (calling for more targeted comparative 
effectiveness research). 
27 J. Woodcock and L. J. Lesko, Pharmacogenetics--Tailoring Treatment for the Outliers, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
811, 811 (2009). 
28 President’s Council of Advisors on Sci. & Tech., REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT REALIZING THE FULL POTENTIAL OF 
HEALTH INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY TO IMPROVE HEALTH CARE FOR AMERICANS: THE PATH FORWARD 64 (2010), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/pcast-health-it-report.pdf (recommending 
use of “large datasets” to address numerous issues in clinical research). 
29 Id. at 63. 
30 Id. at 64. 
31 Efthimios Parasidis, Patients Over Politics: Addressing Legislative Failure in the Regulation of Medical 
Products, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 929, 966-67 (2011). 
32 Id. at 965.  
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 967-68. 
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“evidence-based decision support, quality management, and health-outcomes reporting at both 
the individual and population levels.”35 
 
 In the realm of health information technology, Parasidis, Hoffman, and Podgurski are 
among the first legal academics to convincingly merge literatures of health system 
transformation, practical implementation, and legal guidance.  They suggest the practical 
feasibility of transforming healthcare generally, and post-market pharmaceutical surveillance in 
particular, into an information industry with the types of productivity gains we usually associate 
only with Silicon Valley.36  As Parasidis notes of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration’s 
(FDA) deployment of “Mini-Sentinel:” 
 
Rather than creating a centralized database, Mini-Sentinel uses a 
distributed data network that is linked by a coordinating center.  
The Mini-Sentinel data network incorporates EHRs from diverse 
data sets that are maintained by public and private stakeholders.  
Each data partner retains control over its own patient-level data 
and permits others to access its aggregated and de-identified 
medical data.37 
 
Just as the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the National Security Agency have 
advanced domestic intelligence capabilities by querying distributed databases from diverse 
public and private sector partners, the FDA now can apply such technology toward improving 
population health.38  For example, consider the deficiencies in America’s system of 
pharmacovigilance -- “the science and activities relating to the detection, assessment, 
understanding and prevention of adverse effects or any other drug-related problem.”39  The 
tactics and methods developed by leading information industries could be applied to the 
assessment of drugs and devices, raising very difficult issues under health privacy laws. 
  
                                                          
35 Id. at 964. 
36 See id. at 984-86 (proposing integration of post-market drug surveillance into an extant health IT infrastructure); 
Hoffman & Podgurski, Improving Health Care Outcomes, supra note 25, at 425 (proposing the development of a 
“broadly accessible framework” that enables doctors to quickly perform comparisons of treatments); Hoffman & 
Podgurski, Finding A Cure: The Case for Regulation and Oversight of Electronic Health Record Systems, 22 HARV. 
J. L & TECH. 103, 151 (2008) (recommending regulations that require doctors to use information technology to 
improve practices).  
37 Parasidis, supra note 31, at 971. 
38 For an account of the DHS approach, see Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, Network Accountability for the 
Domestic Intelligence Apparatus, 62 HASTINGS L. J. 1441, 1449 (2011) (discussing the close ties of private entities 
to state and federal “fusion centers,” which collect and share information and intelligence). 
39 World Health Organization, THE IMPORTANCE OF PHARMACOVIGILANCE 7 (2002), available at 
http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/pdf/s4893e/s4893e.pdf.   
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 Observational research (based on actual patients’ experience with drugs and procedures) 
may turn out to be more useful than clinical trials in many ways once a critical mass of outcomes 
has been recorded and researchers can control for environmental and other variations.40 Digitized 
health data should enable extraordinary new possibilities for medical research.41   
 
 Efthimios Parasidis’s article, Patients Over Politics, examines the implications of new 
technologies for pharmacovigilance.42  Parasidis envisions taking the type of analysis in 
comparisons of treatment effectiveness to a population-wide analysis.  He convincingly argues 
that post-approval surveillance will only reach its full potential if a wider array of stakeholders 
begins to take advantage of the emerging health data infrastructure to critically evaluate the 
effects of various treatments.43  The free flows of data elevated to constitutional status in the case 
of Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.44 may also eventually improve pharmacovigilance.45  But just as 
Sorrell eviscerated a Vermont patient privacy law in order to promote data flows, so future 
decisions in this area may end up limiting efforts by policymakers to define and enforce the 
proper restrictions on data flows.46 
 
  Finally, there is the growing pressure from patients to develop control over medical 
records for their own purposes.  While HITECH split responsibility for EHRs and personal 
health records (PHRs) between the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and 
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the centrifugal pressure toward integrated and 
comprehensive databases may not make this a sensible decision for long.  While the “sharing or 
exchange of data between PHRs and healthcare providers or their EHRs” was “speculative” as of 
2009,47  the interfaces between PHRs and EHRs will be tested by new applications and mobile 
health (mHealth) developments.48 For example, members of the “quantified self” movement can 
                                                          
40 Id. at 66-67. 
41President’s Council of Advisors on Sci. & Tech., supra note 28, at 5 (describing potential improvements in care). 
42Parasidis, supra note 31, at 977 (proposing “reform measures that mitigate risk-enhancing aspects of the regulatory 
framework for medical products”). 
43 Id. at 970–74. 
44 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011). 
45 Id. at 2670-72 (ruling that drug companies have a constitutional right to access certain types of data without undue 
state interference).  For a critical description of the stakes of Sorrell, see David Orentlicher, Prescription Data 
Mining and the Protection of Patients’ Interests, 38 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 74, 81  (2010) (“When people develop 
relationships with their physicians and pharmacists, they are entitled to the assurance that information about their 
medical condition will be used for their benefit and not to place their health at risk or to increase their health care 
costs.”); Frank Pasquale, Privacy as a First Amendment Value, THE HEALTH CARE BLOG (Apr. 29, 2011), 
http://thehealthcareblog.com/blog/2011/04/29/rethinking-ims-health-v-sorrell-privacy-as-a-first-amendment-value/.  
46 Beverly Cohen, Regulating Data Mining Post-Sorrell: Using HIPAA to Restrict Marketing Uses of Patients' 
Private Medical Information, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1141, 1148 (2012); Orentlicher, supra note 45, at 74; 
Michael Heesters, An Assault on the Business of Pharmaceutical Data Mining, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 789 (2009). 
47 Nicolas P. Terry, Personal Health Records: Directing More Costs and Risks to Consumers?, 1 DREXEL L. REV. 
216, 226 (2009). 
48 Ethan Katsh, et al., Is there an App for That? Electronic Health Records and a New Environment of Conflict 
Prevention and Resolution, 74 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 31, 34 (2011) (describing translational difficulties between 
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track their pulse, sleep time, weight, mood, and meters walked per day, based on smartphone-
enabled self-monitoring.49  Isn’t some or all of this data (properly summarized or visualized) 
something that a physician or wellness coach would want some access to?  Yet providers may 
not be building in the type of “privacy by design” necessary to make this type of data exchange 
safe for all involved in it.   
More modest forms of clinical decision support may also merge with marketing.  Cash-
strapped practices are also liable to want to try to buy in to “free” EHR models which are ad-
based.  Even once HITECH subsidies are accounted for, physicians will still often treat their IT 
spend as a fixed cost to be minimized.  One of the most successful cloud-based email hosting 
services, Gmail, capitalizes on data analyzed in its records to serve targeted ads.  Some EHRs are 
based on this model, and may well be aiming to synthesize multiple records (or a whole 
practice’s records) to sell high-impact advertising opportunities to pharmaceutical firms, device 
makers, or other entities.  Given the technological flavor of much recent fraud enforcement effort 
at the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) and its various contractors, such data 
may also be very useful for their purposes as well.50 
III.  Health Privacy and Data Security in a Cloud Computing Context 
Cloud computing may fuel a convergence of research, treatment, and marketing 
opportunities.  But before it can do so, healthcare providers, health plans, and other healthcare 
entities covered by HIPAA (“covered entities” or CEs) must be assured that they will be able to 
abide by longstanding privacy and security obligations under HIPAA.  This section explores how 
aspects of HIPAA will affect both covered entities’ and patients’ views of cloud computing 
options.  Part A examines the role of business associate agreements (and regulation of business 
associates (BAs)) in assuring accountability in a networked cloud computing environment. Part 
B explores some of the issues patients are likely to raise (and face) as cloud computing becomes 
more popular. 
 
A.  HIPAA in the Cloud from a Covered Entity’s Perspective 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
EHRs and PHRs, and noting that “the transition from paper to digital in the healthcare field is still . . . an extremely 
complex transition involving patients, doctors, and a variety of old and new stakeholders.”); Lisa Wangsness, 
Electronic Health Records Raise Doubt, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 13, 2009, at C1 (describing mistake in downloading 
of EHR information to a PHR).    
49 Anita Allen, Dredging Up the Past: Lifelogging, Memory, and Surveillance, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 47 (2008) (“The 
lifelog could easily store data pertaining to purely biological states derived from continuous self-monitoring of, for 
example, heart rate, respiration, blood sugar, blood pressure, and arousal.”).   
50 Kathleen Sebelius, Sec’y Dep’t Health & Human Servs.,  Address at the Stop Medicare Fraud Summit (Aug. 26, 
2010), available at http://www.hhs.gov/secretary/about/speeches/smfsummit.html (“Under the new law, we’re also 
making it easier for law enforcement officials to see health care claims data from around the country in one place, 
combining all Medicare-paid claims into a single, searchable database.”). 
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Among the Omnibus HIPAA Rule provisions most significant for cloud computing are 
those pertaining to liability.51  The final rule makes clear that liability extends down the chain 
well beyond covered entities to reach business associates, which include certain subcontractors.52  
While the prior HIPAA model of enforcement focused on CEs, after the HITECH Act, a 
business associate is regulated directly by HIPAA, making BAs directly liable for civil monetary 
penalties for their violations.53  HIPAA also contains a breach notification rule, which binds CEs 
and BAs.54  As discussed below, a cloud service provider that creates, receives, maintains, or 
transmits PHI on behalf of a covered entity comes within HIPAA’s definition of business 
associate,55 and thus it is important for cloud service providers to understand the magnitude of 
these liability provisions. 
1.   Responsibilities of Covered Entities  
 Under the Omnibus HIPAA Rule, CEs remain responsible for a host of Privacy Rule and 
Security Rule requirements aimed at safeguarding protected health information.56  For example, 
the Privacy Rule requires a CE, among other things, to adopt written privacy policies and 
procedures; designate a privacy official to implement these policies and procedures; and train its 
                                                          
51 The recent Omnibus HIPAA Rule is designed to “strengthen the privacy and security protections established 
under [HIPAA] for individual’s health information maintained in electronic health records and other formats.”  
Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, Enforcement, and Breach-Notification Rules Under the Health 
Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act; 
Other Modifications to the HIPAA Rules; Final Rule,” 78 Fed. Reg. 5566, 5566 (Jan. 25, 2013) [hereinafter Final 
Omnibus HIPAA Rule Preamble, 78 Fed. Reg at X].  In addition, the rule intends to “increase flexibility for and 
decrease burden on the regulated entities.”  Id. 
52 The HIPAA Privacy Rule regulates covered entities' use and disclosure of protected health information. The 
covered entities regulated by HIPAA include most health plans, healthcare providers, and health care 
clearinghouses. The term “health care provider” is defined by the Rule as “a provider of services . . . , a provider of 
medical or health services . . . , and any other person or organization who furnishes, bills, or is paid for health care in 
the normal course of business.” 45 C.F.R. § 160.103.  Under HIPAA, any time a covered entity uses or discloses 
protected health information, the use or disclosure must comply with HIPAA's privacy provisions. The term “use” is 
broadly defined as “the sharing, employment, application, utilization, examination, or analysis” of health 
information protected by HIPAA.  Id.  “Disclosure” is also broadly defined as “the release, transfer, provision of, 
access to, or divulging in any other manner of information outside the entity holding the information.”  Id. 
53 42 U.S.C. § 17931 (“In the case of a business associate that violates any security provision . . . [the civil monetary 
penalties rules] shall apply to the business associate with respect to such violation in the same manner such sections 
apply to a covered entity that violates such security provision.”); see also 45 C.F.R. § 160.402. 
54 After HITECH, any BA or “third party servicer,” upon discovery of a breach, must notify the CE within a 
reasonable time (not to exceed 60 days).  42 U.S.C. § 17932(b), (d)(1) (2012).  The CE, then, must notify the patient 
of the breach within a reasonable time (not to exceed 60 days).  42 U.S.C. § 17932(a), (d)(1) (2012).  Moreover, if 
the data breach affects more than 500 people, the CE also must notify HHS and the media.  42 U.S.C. § 17932(e)(2), 
(3).  The responsibilities of the parties with respect to notification should be outlined and described in the agreement 
between the CE and the cloud servicer.  Foley & Lardner, supra note 16, at 13-14 (“Beyond establishing the 
procedural requirements and timeframes for reporting to the customer, the agreement should set forth the procedures 
and role of the parties with respect to investigation of the breach and notification of individuals.”).  See also 45 
C.F.R. §§ 164.400414 (HIPAA breach notification rules). 
55 See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103. 
56 The Omnibus HIPAA Rule defines protected health information in 45 C.F.R. § 160.103. 
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workforce with respect to these policies.57  The Security Rule requires a CE “to maintain 
reasonable and appropriate administrative, technical, and physical safeguards to prevent 
intentional or unintentional use or disclosure of protected health information in violation of the 
Privacy Rule and to limit its incidental use and disclosure pursuant to otherwise permitted or 
required use or disclosure.” 58  Among the Security Rules requirements is an obligation for CEs 
to “[c]onduct an accurate and thorough assessment of the potential risks and vulnerabilities to the 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of electronic protected health information held by the 
covered entity . . . .”59 CEs are permitted to disclose PHI to a BA “if the covered entity obtains 
satisfactory assurance that the business associate will appropriately safeguard the information,” 
although they are not required, however, to obtain satisfactory assurances from a BA that is a 
subcontractor.60  In the event of a breach of unsecured PHI, a CE is responsible for making the 
notifications to individuals, the media, and the Secretary, as applicable, as set forth in Subpart D 
of the Omnibus HIPAA Rule.61  
If a CE fails to comply with an administrative simplification provision, it is directly liable 
for civil, and in some cases criminal, penalties, as discussed in Section 3(A)(iii), below.62  The 
Omnibus HIPAA Rule eliminated an affirmative defense that had allowed a covered entity to 
avoid a penalty if it “did not know and with the exercise of reasonable diligence would not have 
known of the violation (since such violations are now punishable under the lowest tier of 
penalties).” 63  It also eliminated an exception to liability “for the acts of its agent in cases where 
the agent is a business associate, the relevant contract requirements have been met, the covered 
entity did not know of a pattern or practice of the business associate in violation of the contract, 
and the covered entity did not fail to act as required by the Privacy or Security Rule with respect 
to such violations.”64  In addition, a CE “must mitigate, to the extent practicable, any harmful 
effect it learns was caused by use or disclosure of protected health information by its workforce 
or its business associates in violation of its privacy policies and procedures or the Privacy 
Rule.”65  But as long as a violation occurring after February 18, 2009 is not due to willful neglect 
                                                          
57 See 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.520, 164.530(a)(1), (b); Alden J. Bianchi et al., Mintz Levin, Advisory: The New HIPAA 
Omnibus Rule & Your Liability (Feb. 15, 2013), http://www.mintz.com/newsletter/2013/Advisories/2663-0213-
NAT-HL/index.html. 
58 Bianchi et al., supra note 58; see 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.302-318 (Security Rule). 
59 45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(A); see also Bianchi et al., supra note 58. 
60 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(e)(1)(i). 
61 See id. §§ 164.400-414. 
62 Id. § 160.402(a); Final Omnibus HIPAA Rule Preamble, supra note 51, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5589. 
63 Final Omnibus HIPAA Rule Preamble, supra note 51, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5585; see also James Swann, BNA Health 
IT Law & Industry Report, Final HIPAA Enforcement Rule Includes Increased Civil Money Penalty Structure (Jan. 
21, 2013). 
64 Final Omnibus HIPAA Rule Preamble, supra note 51, 78 Fed Reg at 5580; James Swann, supra note 63. 
65 Bianchi et al., supra note 57. 
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and the CE corrects it within thirty days, HHS may not impose a civil monetary penalty on the 
CE.66   
  2.  Provisions Allocating Responsibility and Liability to Business Associates 
HIPAA’s Privacy Rule has long required CEs to have contracts or other arrangements 
with BAs “to ensure that the business associates safeguard protected health information, and use 
and disclose the information only as permitted or required by the Privacy Rule.”67  The Security 
Rule similarly has required CEs to “have contracts or other arrangements in place with their 
business associates that provide satisfactory assurances that the business associates will 
appropriately safeguard the electronic protected health information they create, receive, 
maintain, or transmit on behalf of the covered entities.”68  Prior to the Omnibus HIPAA Rule, if 
BAs violated these requirements, CEs could seek damages for breach of the business associate 
agreement (BAA), but BAs were not subject to penalties from HHS if they violated HIPAA.69 
As required by HITECH, the Omnibus HIPAA Rule makes BAs directly liable for 
compliance with certain of the HIPAA Privacy and Security Rules.70  A BA will be directly 
liable, for example, for any uses or disclosures of PHI that violate the Privacy Rule or the terms 
of its BAA.71  BAs also are required to provide notification to the CE in the event of a breach of 
unsecured PHI; to comply with the minimum necessary rule; to cooperate with the Secretary 
during complaint investigations and compliance reviews; to provide an accounting of disclosures 
of PHI; and to make an electronic copy of PHI available to an individual or CE when an 
individual requests it.72 
BAs also must comply with all facets of the Security Rule, which Joy Pritts, chief privacy 
officer at the Office of the National Coordinator for Health IT, has called “the most significant 
                                                          
66 See 45 C.F.R. § 160.410(c); James Swann, supra note 63.  
67 Final Omnibus HIPAA Rule Preamble, supra note 51, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5567.   
68 Id.  
69 See Robert Belfort et al., Bloomberg BNA Health IT Law & Industry Report, HIPAA Omnibus Rule Reshapes 
Landscape for Health Care Privacy, Security Compliance (Jan. 28, 2013), available at 
http://www.manatt.com/uploadedFiles/Content/4_News_and_Events/Newsletters/HealthLaw@Manatt/BNA%20Art
icle_HIPAA%20Omnibus%20Rule.pdf. 
70 See 45 C.F.R. § 160.102(b); see also Final Omnibus HIPAA Rule Preamble, supra note 51, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5566, 
5568. 
71 See 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a)(3); Final Omnibus HIPAA Rule Preamble, supra note 51, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5568; Carlos 
Leyva, HIPAA Omnibus Rule Summary (Feb. 3, 2013), http://www.hipaasurvivalguide.com/hipaa-omnibus-rule.php.  
72 See 45 C.F.R. §§ 160.310(b), 164.410, 164.502(a)(4)(ii), (b),164.528; Bianchi et al., supra note 57; Belfort et al., 
supra note 69; Leyva, supra note 71. BAs are not subject to all Privacy Rule requirements.  For example, they are 
not required to provide notice of privacy practices or to designate a privacy official, unless required by the 
applicable BAA.  See 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.520, 164.530(a)(1)(i);  Employee Benefits & Executive Compensation, 
ADVISORY: New HIPAA Omnibus Rule: Issues for Employer Plan Sponsors and Group Health Plans (Mar. 11, 
2013),  http://www.alston.com/Files/Publication/19c1650b-c278-4abf-9c1b-
9fff28d27c4a/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/7ed0617b-c6b1-4350-8e38-a5295c262cd1/13-195-HIPPA-
Omnibus-Rule.pdf. 
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security provision in the massive new Omnibus HIPAA Rule.”73  Thus, BAs are responsible for 
completing a risk analysis and complying with HIPAA’s administrative, physical, and technical 
safeguard provisions, among other requirements.74 
The Omnibus HIPAA Rule also revised the definition of BAs to expressly include 
particular entities, including many cloud service providers.  First, it expressly includes “[a] 
Health Information Organization, E-prescribing Gateway, or other person that provides data 
transmission services with respect to protected health information to a covered entity and that 
requires access on a routine basis to such protected health information.”75  Citing the evolving 
nature of what organizations will qualify as health information organizations, HHS declined to 
define this term, but it indicated its intention to publish additional guidance.76 
HHS did, however, provide guidance in the preamble to the  Omnibus HIPAA Rule as to 
what it means to have access on a routine basis to PHI.  This fact-specific determination looks to 
“the nature of the services provided and the extent to which the entity needs access to protected 
health information to perform the service for the covered entity.”77  While mere conduits of PHI 
do not satisfy this requirement, HHS emphasized that the conduit exception is narrow and 
“intended to exclude only those entities providing mere courier services, such as the U.S. Postal 
Service or United Parcel Service and their electronic equivalents, such as internet service 
providers (ISPs), providing mere data transmission services.”78  Mere transmission includes 
“temporary storage of transmitted data incident to such transmission.”79 Conduits transport PHI 
but “do not access it other than on a random or infrequent basis as necessary to perform the 
transportation service or as required by other law.”80  But an entity that requires access to PHI to 
perform a service for a covered entity – “such as a Health Information Organization that 
manages the exchange of [PHI] through a network on behalf of covered entities through the use 
                                                          
73 Howard Anderson, The Security Highlight of HIPAA Omnibus Shining a Spotlight on Business Associates (Mar. 1, 
2013), http://www.bankinfosecurity.com/blogs/security-highlight-hipaa-omnibus-p-1431. 
74  45 C.F.R. §§ 164.302-318 (Security Rule); Employee Benefits & Executive Compensation, supra note 72. 
75 45 C.F.R. § 160.103; Final Omnibus HIPAA Rule Preamble, supra note 51, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5571.  The Rule 
defines “person” to mean “a natural person, trust or estate, partnership, corporation, professional association or 
corporation, or other entity, public of private.” 45 C.F.R. § 160.103. 
76 See Final Omnibus HIPAA Rule Preamble, supra note 51, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5571.  As discussed in the text below, 
while the old rule had no mention of a company that merely stored data, leading to much industry confusion, the 
Omnibus HIPAA Rule states a BA is a person who, on behalf of a CE: “creates, receives, maintains, or transmits 
protected health information for a function or activity regulated by this subchapter.”  Id. at 5688.  HHS makes clear 
that “an entity that maintains protected health information on behalf of a covered entity is a business associate and 
not a conduit, even if the entity does not actually view the protected health information.”  Id. at 5571. 
77 Id.  
78 See id. 
79 See id. 
80 See id. at 5572. 
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of record locator services for its participants”  --  is not a mere conduit and instead is a business 
associate.81 
Entities need not access PHI, however, to be deemed business associates.  Rather, an 
entity that maintains, as distinguished from an entity that merely transmits, PHI on behalf of a 
covered entity is a business associate, even if the entity does not access the PHI.  For example, “a 
data storage company that has access to protected health information (whether digital or hard 
copy) qualifies as a business associate, even if the entity does not view the information or only 
does so on a random or infrequent basis.”82  HHS explained that although conduits and entities 
that maintain PHI both have the opportunity to access PHI, “the difference between the two 
situations is the transient versus persistent nature of that opportunity.”  To reflect this distinction, 
HHS amended the definition of business associate to include creating, receiving, maintaining, or 
transmitting PHI on behalf of a covered entity.83 
At a recent conference, David Holtzman of HHS’s Office for Civil Rights (OCR) 
indicated that cloud service providers are BAs if among their functions performed on behalf of 
CEs is to maintain PHI, even if the contract does not “‘contemplate any access or access only on 
a random or incidental basis,’” because “[t]he test is persistence of custody, not the degree – if 
any – of access.”84  Yet he also reportedly acknowledged a potential qualification to this rule 
related to encryption.  According to Holtzman, OCR has not yet determined whether HIPAA will 
bind an entity that maintains encrypted data for a CE but does not have the key to access that 
data.85  It is crucial for OCR to clarify its position on this issue, given that it is not uncommon for 
cloud service providers to maintain encrypted PHI without the key.         
The Omnibus HIPAA Rule also makes plain that “[a] person that offers a personal health 
record to one or more individuals on behalf of a covered entity” also is a business associate for 
purposes of HIPAA obligations and liability.86  Not all personal health record vendors are 
business associates, however, and HHS expects to issue future guidance on this issue.87  Whether 
a vendor offers personal health records on behalf of a covered entity is a fact-sensitive inquiry.88  
HHS opined that it is insufficient for a vendor and covered entity to enter “an interoperability 
relationship” by, for example, establishing the electronic means (i.e., an interface) for a covered 
                                                          
81 See id. 
82 See id. 
83 See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103; Final Omnibus HIPAA Rule Preamble, supra note 51, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5572.   
84 Kendra Casey Plank, Cloud Providers Often Are Business Associates under HIPAA, Officials Say, 22 HEALTH 
LAW REPORTER 858 (BNA) (June 6, 2013) (quoting Holtzman at “Safeguarding Health Information: Building 
Assurance through HIPAA Security,” a conference sponsored by OCR and the National Institute for Standards and 
Technology on May 21-22, 2013). 
85 See id. 
86 45 C.F.R. § 160.103; Final Omnibus HIPAA Rule Preamble, supra note 51, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5571. 
87 Final Omnibus HIPAA Rule Preamble, supra note 51, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5572. 
88 Id. 
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entity’s electronic health record to send PHI to the vendor.89  Even where an individual has given 
written authorization to share data, and the covered entity and vendor have agreed on details 
regarding data sharing, such as technical specifications for the exchange of data and the need for 
confidentiality, the vendor is not necessarily offering the record on behalf of the covered entity.90  
But a vendor hired by and given access to PHI by a covered entity to permit the vendor “to 
provide and manage a personal health record service” for the covered entity’s patients or 
enrollees is a business associate.91   Where a vendor offers personal health records both directly 
to individuals and on behalf of covered entities, the vendor is deemed a business associate only 
in the latter capacity.92  HHS explained that the conduit exception does not apply to a vendor 
offering a personal health record to an individual on behalf of a covered entity because such a 
vendor is maintaining PHI and not serving as a mere conduit.93  Consistent with its treatment of 
data storage companies, such a vendor is a business associate if it has the ability to access PHI, 
even if it does not exercise this ability.94 
The Rule also defines business associates to include “a subcontractor that creates, 
receives, maintains, or transmits protected health information on behalf of the business 
associate.”95  Subcontractor, in turn, “means a person to whom a business associate delegates a 
function, activity, or service, other than in the capacity of a member of the workforce96 of such 
business associate.”97  HHS explains that the function, activity, or service delegated to the 
subcontractor is one the business associate agreed to perform for a covered entity or another 
business associate.98 
Determining if a subcontractor is acting on behalf of a business associate is the same 
analysis that applies to whether a business associate is acting on behalf of a covered entity.99  For 
example, if a business associate third party administrator hires a company to perform document 
and media shredding and disposal of PHI, this shredding company would be directly responsible 
for complying with applicable HIPAA Security and Privacy Rules.100 Similarly, a subcontractor 
                                                          
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 45 C.F.R. § 160.103. 
96 “Workforce means employees, volunteers, trainees, and other persons whose conduct, in the performance of work 
for a covered entity or business associate, is under the direct control of such covered entity or business associate, 
whether or not they are paid by the covered entity or business associate.”  Id. 
97 Id. 
98 Final Omnibus HIPAA Rule Preamble, supra note 51, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5573. 
99 Id. at 5572. 
100 Id. at 5573.  But if a business associate hires a subcontractor to shred documents that do not contain PHI, then the 
subcontractor is not a business associate.  See id. at 5574.  
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hired to support a business associate with personal health record functions is a business associate 
and thus required to comply with HIPAA’s breach notification rule.101 
This subcontractor revision aims to prevent covered entities and business associates from 
avoiding liability for HIPAA privacy and security violations by subcontracting functions.102  
“[D]ownstream entities that work at the direction of or on behalf of a business associate and 
handle protected health information would also be required to comply with the applicable 
Privacy and Security Rule provisions in the same manner as the primary business associate, and 
likewise would incur liability for acts of noncompliance.”103  Thus, just as CEs must obtain 
satisfactory assurances from their BAs,  
business associates must do the same with regard to subcontractors 
[that satisfy the Omnibus HIPAA Rule’s definition], and so on, no 
matter how far ‘down the chain’ the information flows.  This 
ensures that individuals’ health information remains protected by 
all parties that create, receive, maintain, or transmit the information 
in order for a covered entity to perform its healthcare functions.104   
 
Carlos Leyva, an internet attorney and frequent contributor to hipaasurvivalguide.com, has 
flagged the “downstream impact’ of this modification” as very significant.105 
Importantly, covered entities are not required to contract directly with subcontractors to 
establish a chain of liability.106  Instead, business associates are responsible for obtaining 
satisfactory assurances in the form of a written contract or other arrangement that a subcontractor 
will appropriately safeguard PHI.107   But HHS intended liability to attach to a subcontractor, 
even if the business associate failed to enter a business associate contract with the subcontractor, 
as long as the party is an agent of, or other person acting on behalf of, the business associate, as 
discussed in Section III.A.3 below.108 
                                                          
101 Final Omnibus HIPAA Rule Preamble, supra note 51, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5572.  HHS emphasized that despite 
extending the definition of business associate to include subcontractors, financial institutions that are performing 
payment processing activities under Section 1179 of HIPAA continue to be excluded from the definition of business 
associates.  See id.   
102  Id. at 5572-73. 
103 Id. at 5573. 
104 Id. at 5574. 
105 Leyva, supra note 71. 
106 See 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.308(b)(1) and 164.502(e)(e)(i); Final Omnibus HIPAA Rule Preamble, supra note 51, 78 
Fed. Reg. at 5573. 
107 See 45 C.F.R. § 164.308(b)(2); HIPAA Omnibus Final Rule Preamble, supra note 51, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5573. 
108 Final Omnibus HIPAA Rule Preamble, supra note 51, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5572; see also Leyva, supra note 71 (“A 
person/entity ("Person") becomes a Business Associate by definition, and NOT because there happens to be a 
Business Associate contract in place; therefore liability attaches immediately when a Person "creates, receives, 
maintains, or transmits Protected Health Information on behalf of a Covered Entity.”) (emphasis in original). 
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This expansion of HIPAA’s reach makes business associates, including subcontractors 
who satisfy HIPAA’s definition of BAs, directly liable for civil monetary, and in some cases 
criminal, penalties for violations of applicable HIPAA rules.109 
3.  Agency Liability of Covered Entities and Business Associates  
In addition to being liable for their own HIPAA violations, covered entities and business 
associates also can be liable for civil monetary penalties for their agents’ violations.110  Under 
the Omnibus HIPAA Rule, a CE or BA “is liable, in accordance with the Federal common law of 
agency, for a civil money penalty for a violation based on the act or omission of any agent of the 
covered entity [or business associate] . . . acting within the scope of the agency.”111  Agents of 
CEs may include a workforce member or business associate, whereas agents of BAs may include 
a workforce member or a subcontractor.112  HHS intended this revision “to ensure, where a 
covered entity or business associate has delegated out an obligation under the HIPAA Rules, that 
a covered entity or business associate would remain liable for penalties for the failure of its 
business associate agent to perform the obligation on the covered entity or business associate’s 
behalf,” even if a compliant business associate agreement is in place.113 
In adopting this revision, HHS expressed its view that liability for agency violations 
would not unduly burden CEs or BAs, finding that liability for agents is customary under the 
common law.114  Despite describing agency liability as customary, HHS offered additional 
guidance on when a BA will be deemed an agent.  This fact-specific inquiry considers the terms 
of the BAA and the totality of the circumstances involved in the relationship between the 
parties.115  Importantly, HHS rejected comments suggesting that parties could avoid these fact-
intensive inquiries by determining agency in their contracts.   Using terms, statements, or labels 
such as independent contractor to refer to a party in the contract will not control the agency 
analysis.116 
                                                          
109 See 45 C.F.R. § 160.402(a); Final Omnibus HIPAA Rule Preamble, supra note 51, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5589. 
110 45 C.F.R. § 160.402(c); Final Omnibus HIPAA Rule Preamble, supra note 51, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5580.  
111 45 C.F.R. § 160.402(c)(1)-(2).  HHS omitted from Section 160.402 the prior exception to agency liability “for 
covered entity liability for the acts of its agent in cases where the agent is a business associate, the relevant contract 
requirements have been met, the covered entity did not know of a pattern or practice of the business associate in 
violation of the contract, and the covered entity did not fail to act as required by the Privacy or Security Rule with 
respect to such violations.” Final Omnibus HIPAA Rule Preamble, supra note 51, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5580. 
112 45 C.F.R. § 160.402(c)(1)-(2). 
113 Final Omnibus HIPAA Rule Preamble, supra note 51, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5580. 
114 Id. at 5581. 
115 Id. 
116 Id.; see also Leyva, supra note 71 (“Covered Entities and Business Associates are liable for the acts of their 
Business Associate agents. Comment: the Federal Common Law of Agency is controlling AND Covered Entities 
and Business Associates need to pay close attention to the amount of control they exercise over a third party with 
which they have a Business Associate contract. What the parties call each other is not dispositive; exercise of control 
is key.”) (emphasis in original).  
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Rather, the focus of the agency analysis is whether the covered entity, or business 
associate, in the context of business associate-subcontractor relationships, has “the right or 
authority . . . to control the business associate’s conduct in the course of performing a service on 
behalf of the covered entity [or business associate].”117  An example of the type of control that 
distinguishes agency from non-agency relationships is when a covered entity or business 
associate has authority to give interim instructions or directions during the course of the 
relationship.  But agency generally will not exist where a BAA “sets terms and conditions that 
create contractual obligations between the two parties.”118  As HHS explained, “if the only 
avenue of control is for a covered entity to amend the terms of the agreement or sue for breach of 
contract, this generally indicates that a business associate is not acting as an agent.”119  Thus, 
where a covered entity delegates or contracts out performance of a specific HIPAA obligation, 
whether the business associate is an agent of the CE will “depend on the right or authority to 
control the business associate’s conduct in the performance of the delegated service based on the 
right of a covered entity to give interim instructions.”120 
HHS also identified several factors to consider in determining the scope of agency: (1) 
the time, place, and purpose of a business associate’s conduct; (2) whether a business associate’s 
agent engaged in a course of conduct subject to a covered entity’s control; (3) whether a business 
associate agent’s conduct is commonly done by a business associate to accomplish the service 
performed on behalf of a covered entity; and (4) whether or not the covered entity reasonably 
expected that a business associate agent would engage in the conduct in question.121 
In rejecting a commentator’s suggestion that there would be no agency liability when a 
BA breaches the BAA, HHS explained that just because a BA deviates from the terms of a BAA 
does not mean that the BA is operating outside of the scope of agency.122  As a general rule, a 
BA agent’s conduct is within the scope of agency when it “occurs during the performance of the 
assigned work or incident to such work, regardless of whether the work was done carelessly, a 
mistake was made in the performance, or the business associate disregarded a covered entity’s 
specific instruction.”123  But a BA generally acts outside of the scope of agency when its conduct 
“is solely for its own benefit (or that of a third party)” or the conduct is “not intended to serve 
any purpose of the covered entity.”124 
                                                          
117 Final Omnibus HIPAA Rule Preamble, supra note 51, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5581. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. 
121 See id. 
122 Id. at 5582. 
123 Id. But cf. id. at 5587 (“An agent that fails to notify a covered entity or business associate may be acting outside 
its scope of authority as an agent.”) 
124 Id. 
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An important consideration in determining if the BA is an agent is the type of service and 
skill level required to perform the service.125  For example, HHS opined that it is unlikely that a 
business associate hired by a small provider to de-identify PHI would be deemed its agent since 
it is unlikely the covered entity has the requisite expertise with this particular service to give 
interim instructions to the BA.126  A business associate hired to perform services that a covered 
entity is legally or otherwise prohibited from performing, such as accreditation, is unlikely to be 
deemed to be an agent of that covered entity.127  But a covered entity does not need to retain the 
right or authority to control every aspect of a BA’s activities for the BA to be an agent.128  
Further, a BA can be an agent even if the CE does not exercise its right of control as long as 
there is evidence that it has the authority to do so.129  HHS further made clear that agency can be 
found even where CEs and BAs are geographically dispersed, including if they are in different 
countries.130  
Carlos Leyva recently noted that although “Business Associates and Covered Entities 
should clearly recognize that we are definitely ‘not in Kansas anymore,’” he does not believe the 
healthcare industry has fully realized the implications of these changes.131   As some have 
observed, agency liability “significantly impacts the relationship of covered entities and their 
business associates, potentially requiring greater monitoring by the covered entity when the 
business associate is an agent.”132  CEs and BAs have to wrestle with these fact sensitive issues 
so they can assess the risks of liability from different relationships.  They also need to engage in 
ongoing risk assessment before and during contractual relationships to monitor compliance by 
downstream actors.  OCR is responsible for enforcing the HIPAA Privacy and Security Rules, and 
OCR Director Leon Rodriguez recently commented that “"[o]ne of the most consistent findings 
                                                          
125 Id. at 5581. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. at 5581-82. 
128 Id. at 5582. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
131 Leyva, supra note 71; see generally Proskauer, HHS Issues HIPAA/HITECH Omnibus Final Rule Ushering in 
Significant Changes to Existing Regulations: Client Alert (Jan. 29, 2013), 
http://www.proskauer.com/publications/client-alert/hhs-issues-hipaa-hitech-omnibus-final-rule-ushering-in-
significant-changes-to-existing-regulations/ (“Business associates, including Health Information Organizations, E-
prescribing Gateways, entities that provide data transmission services for PHI and require routine access to such 
PHI, and personal health record vendors will have additional work to do as well, including: drafting and adopting 
policies, procedures and related documents if they do not have them in place already; performing and documenting 
risk assessments if they have not done so; and reviewing their relationships with subcontractors and entering into 
business associate agreements with them as necessary.”). 
132 Rebecca L. Williams et al., DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP, Advisories: New Omnibus Rule Released: HIPAA 
Puts on More Weight (Jan. 23, 2013), http://www.dwt.com/New-Omnibus-Rule-Released-HIPAA-Puts-on-More-
Weight-01-23-2013/. 
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[OCR is seeing] is failure to conduct risk assessments of where protected health information is 
vulnerable.’"133 
CEs and BAs have a great deal of work ahead of them.134  As the Proskauer law firm 
noted, “[c]overed entities and business associates will have to consider carefully how decisions 
to delegate responsibility for tasks such as handling breach notification and their retention of 
authority to provide instructions to their business associates and contractors with respect to 
certain tasks will affect their exposure to liability.”135  Updating and renegotiating BAAs, for 
example, is a “massive” undertaking, especially for large health systems that can have as many 
as 20,000 business associates.136 On January 25, 2013, HHS published an updated sample 
business associate agreement that may be of some assistance, although CEs and BAs almost 
certainly will need to supplement this sample.137  Negotiations could be more contentious and 
protracted now that BAs’ direct liability gives them more reason to be cautious.138 
Although the Omnibus HIPAA Rule was effective March 26, 2013, covered entities and 
business associates have until September 23, 2013 to comply with most of its requirements.139  
Written contracts or other arrangements between CEs and BAs that were entered into before 
January 25, 2013, complied with the law then in effect, and are not renewed or modified from 
March 26, 2013 until September 23, 2013 will be deemed compliant with the Omnibus HIPAA 
                                                          
133 Marianne Kolbasuk McGee, HIPAA Omnibus Compliance Help on Way HHS Rolling Out Web-based 
Educational Tools (Feb. 20, 2013), http://www.healthcareinfosecurity.com/hipaa-omnibus-compliance-help-on-
way-a-5524. 
134 See generally Leyva, supra note 71 (“HHS is saying that compliance with the HIPAA Security Rule was required 
(to a degree) even before the HITECH Act and the HIPAA Omnibus Rule. Therefore, the new HIPAA Security Rule 
requirements should just necessitate incremental adjustments. Although that may be true under the ‘letter of the 
law,’ as a practical matter nothing could be further from the truth. Prior to the HITECH Act HIPAA was an 
unenforced paper tiger. Business Associates have a lot of catching up to do, and for that matter, so do most Covered 
Entities.”). 
135 Proskauer, supra note 131.   The standard for breach notice has changed due to the Omnibus HIPAA Rule.  
Before, notification was only required if a breach caused a “significant risk of harm” to the data subjects.  Deven 
McGraw, Final HIPAA Rules a Major Step Forward, But There's More Work To Be Done, ihealthbeat (Feb, 8, 
2013), http://www.ihealthbeat.org/perspectives/2013/final-hipaa-rules-a-major-step-forward-but-theres-more-work-
to-be-done.aspx.  Now, however, notification is always required unless the discovering entity “demonstrates that 
there is a low probability that the protected health information has been compromised based on a risk assessment” of 
a number of listed factors.”  Final Omnibus HIPAA Rule Preamble, supra note 51, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5695. 
136 Kendra Casey Plank, Bloomberg BNA Health IT Law & Industry Report, Breach, Business Associate 
Obligations Biggest Provisions in HIPAA Rule, Experts Say (Jan. 21, 2013), available at 
http://www.morganlewis.com/index.cfm/newsID/c1deaa8b-8191-4cb4-9f52-1e7d61986de2/fuseaction/news.detail. 
137 U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servcs., Sample Business Associate Agreement Provisions (published Jan. 25, 
2013), http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/coveredentities/contractprov.html. 
138 Anne Foster et al., BakerHostetler, Special Edition: Health Law Update: A Baker's Dozen of Significant Changes 
from the HIPAA/HITECH Rule (Feb. 28, 2013), http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/special-edition-health-law-
update-feb-42876/. 
139 Final Omnibus HIPAA Rule Preamble, supra note 51, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5566.  
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Rule until the earlier of the date it is renewed or modified on or after September 23, 2013; or 
September 22, 2014.140 
4.  Increased Penalties and Enforcement 
This increased liability for BAs comes as HHS finalizes HITECH’s enhanced civil 
monetary penalties for noncompliance with HIPAA’s requirements.141  Before HITECH, HHS 
could impose no greater than $100 for each violation, with an annual cap of $25,000 imposed on 
a given covered entity for identical violations.142  The Omnibus HIPAA Rule adopted a revised 
penalty scheme with penalty amounts ranging from $100 to $50,000 per violation up to a 
maximum aggregate penalty of $1.5 million for violations of an identical provision per calendar 
year.143  Thus, if CEs and BAs violate multiple provisions, the maximum aggregate penalty will 
be $1.5 million per identical violation.144 
In addition to the threat of increased penalty amounts, OCR has indicated that it is 
focused on increasing enforcement efforts, no matter the size of the entities.145  Historically, 
HIPAA enforcement has been lackluster.  But Theodore J. Kobus III from Baker & Hostetler in 
New York described OCR enforcement efforts as “aggressive” since HITECH.146  Lynn Sessions 
with Baker & Hostetler in Houston similarly noted that HHS increasingly has been pursuing 
resolution agreements and civil penalties against “relatively small providers,” who “often are less 
prepared to comply with HIPAA requirements.”147  
In April 2012, for example, OCR reached a $100,000 settlement with Phoenix Cardiac 
Surgery, P.C. (“PCS”), a small cardiology practice. 148  PCS allegedly violated HIPAA by, 
among other things, failing to enter BAAs with cloud service providers that stored and had 
access to electronic PHI and failing to establish adequate policies and safeguards to protect 
PHI.149  OCR Director Leon Rodriguez recently indicated that enforcement under the Omnibus 
HIPAA Rule “will become tougher” and will include enforcement resulting from breach 
investigations and random audits.150  Reportedly, from September 2009 through December 2012, 
                                                          
140 See 45 C.F.R. § 164.532(e). 
141 Final Omnibus HIPAA Rule Preamble, supra note 51, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5566.  
142 Id.. at 5582. 
143 45 C.F.R. § 160.404; Final Omnibus HIPAA Rule Preamble, supra note 51, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5577, 5583. 
144 See, e.g., Leyva, supra note 71 (observing that “there is no theoretical maximum fine per year” because the 
maximum will depend “on how many different kinds of violations are found”). 
145 Kendra Casey Plank, Bloomberg BNA Health IT Law & Industry Report, Enforcement, Compliance Become Hot 
Topics for Covered Entities with Final HIPAA Rule (Jan. 28, 2013); Anna Spencer & Julie Wagner, Bloomberg 
BNA Health IT Law & Industry Report, OCR to Covered Entities: Choose Carefully among Cloud Service 
Providers (Feb. 18, 2013). 
146 Plank, Enforcement, Compliance, supra note 145. 
147 Id. 
148 Spencer & Wagner, supra note 145. 
149 Id. 
150 Cf., e.g., National Conference of State Legislatures, Incentivising State False Claims Acts (last updated Mar. 7, 
2013), http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/health/clarifying-requirements-for-a-state-false-claims-a.aspx  (last 
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OCR received 77,200 HIPAA complaints, investigated 27,500 cases, issued 18,600 corrective 
actions, and collected $14.9 million in fines and resolution settlements.151 According to Director 
Rodriguez, OCR is “’looking for patterns of privacy and security breaches,’ including violations 
that seem to be longstanding and have a high risk of causing harm to individuals.” 152 
B.  HIPAA in the Cloud from a Patient’s Perspective 
 While patients appreciate that their healthcare provider will usually engage in due 
diligence before selecting a cloud service provider, they nevertheless appreciate (if sometimes on 
a visceral or intuitive level) the risks involved in cloud computing scenarios.  As William Pewen 
has observed, “Americans’ support for the use of their electronic health records (EHR)--even to 
facilitate treatment and payment--is limited; 78 percent supported giving physicians access to 
their EHR, while only 30 percent favored health plan access.”153 Those numbers may well 
degenerate as awareness of cloud computing increases. Whenever there is “sharing or storage by 
users of their own information on remote servers owned or operated by others and accessed 
through the Internet or other connections,” there is legitimate concern about additional 
opportunities for hacks, breaches, or misuses to occur.154  
 
 While covered entities and cloud service providers seek legal guidance as they work 
together to safeguard health data, patients have an interest in assuring that their privacy is 
protected.  Privacy concerns of patients have slowed adoption of some digital records.155  
Moreover, where privacy concerns have been ignored (as in the rapid dissemination of pharmacy 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
visited Mar. 15, 2013) (discussing how the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 included provisions designed to “create 
incentives for states to enact anti-fraud legislation modeled after the federal False Claims Act”). 
151  McGee, HIPAA Omnibus Compliance, supra note 133. 
152  Id. 
153 William Pewen, Breach Notice: The Struggle for Medical Records Security Continues (“[P]atients have been 
outraged to receive solicitations for purchases ranging from drugs to burial plots, while at the same time receiving 
care which is too often uncoordinated and unsafe.  It is no wonder that many Americans take a circumspect view of 
health IT.”). 
154 World Privacy Forum, Privacy in the Clouds: Risks to Privacy and Confidentiality from Cloud Computing, at 4, 
available at http://www.worldprivacyforum.org/pdf/WPF_Cloud_Privacy_Report.pdf (2009). 
155 See generally Roger S. Magnusson, The Changing Legal and Conceptual Shape of Health Care Privacy, 32 J.L. 
Med. & Ethics 680, 685 (2004).  Patient concerns are not hypothetical; data breaches have been on the rise.  
Reported Health Data Breaches Rose by 97% in 2011, IHEALTHBEAT (Feb. 1, 2012), 
http://www.ihealthbeat.org/articles/2012/2/1/health-data-breaches-increased-by-97-in-2011-report-finds.aspx; Scott 
Gibson, Stolen Medical Records One of the Most Lucrative Forms of ID Theft, HEALTHCARETECHREVIEW (Dec. 13, 
2011), http://healthcaretechreview.com/stolen-medical-records-lucrative/. Over 21 million patients have suffered 
data security breaches reported to the federal government over the past three years.  See section 13402(e)(4) of the 
HITECH Act, at U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Health Information Services, Breaches Affecting 
500 Patients or More, http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/administrative/breachnotificationrule/breachtool.html 
(last visited Nov. 11, 2012). 
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dossiers by reputational intermediaries in the early and mid-2000s), they have led to unfair, 
invasive, and irremediable violations of the privacy of individuals.156 
 
 The Omnibus HIPAA Rule addressed some of these concerns.  For example, by 
rendering BAs directly liable for compliance with provisions of the Security and Privacy Rules, 
it clarified what could have been a source of troubling regulatory arbitrage.157  It applied data 
security rules to “downstream entities,” making cloud service providers of EHR more 
responsible.  BAs are required to obtain assurances that disclosures they make (that are not 
required by law) will be “confidential.”  Civil penalties for BAs also provide important 
incentives for proper behavior.   
 
 As rulemaking (and clarifications of rules) continue, predictable criticisms have been 
launched.  Some insist that complexity in their fields can never truly be grasped by regulators or 
rendered clear to consumers.  Others accuse HHS of engaging in stealth industrial policy, picking 
winners and losers in the healthcare field by effectively outlawing certain business models and 
promoting others.  The question now is how to respect legitimate efforts to innovate, while still 
protecting vital patient interests in privacy (and understanding how data is being used and 
shared).  
1. Patient Rights of Access to Records and Accountings of Disclosures 
 If patients are to fully “buy in” to digitization of health records (and the full array of 
opportunities for use of them), they will need to be able to understand exactly how their digital 
records exist (and are used) in an increasingly complex virtual landscape. Patients need to 
engage in “the right to an accounting of disclosures of protected health information made by a 
covered entity in the six years prior to the date on which the accounting is requested,” and to 
have the information in formats that allow their own trusted interpreters to make sense of it.158  
Before HITECH, the HIPAA Privacy Rule made it very difficult for patients to fully understand 
the nature and range of health information accumulated about them, especially because 
disclosures for “treatment, payment and health care operations” did not need to be accounted 
for.159  After HITECH, any record kept electronically needs to be in the accounting.160 
                                                          
156 See, e.g., Chad Terhune, They Know What’s in Your Medicine Cabinet, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (July 22, 
2008), http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/08_31/b4094000643943.htm (“Two-thirds of all health 
insurers are using prescription data--not only to deny coverage to individuals and families but also to charge some 
customers higher premiums or exclude certain medical conditions from policies, according to agents and others in 
the industry.”); Sarah Ludington, Reining in the Data Traders: A Tort for the Misuse of Personal Information, 66 
MD. L. REV. 140, 162 (2006) (“Without consent, CVS Pharmacy, Inc. (CVS) mined its customer prescription 
records for the purpose of sending its customers mailings targeted to their specific medical conditions. . . .”). 
157 Marianne Kolbasuk McGee, HIPAA Omnibus Rule Released, Contains Long-Overdue Rule Modifications, DATA 
BREACH TODAY (Jan. 17, 2013), http://www.databreachtoday.com/hipaa-omnibus-rule-released-a-5433. 
158 45 C.F.R. § 164.528, available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2010-title45-vol1/pdf/CFR-2010-title45-
vol1-sec164-528.pdf. 
159 Id. 
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 Nevertheless, several critical decisions need to be made to assure that this is actually a 
meaningful right for patients.  In its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for HIPAA Privacy Rule 
Accounting of Disclosures Under the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical 
Health Act, HHS recognized that “use of audit trails and the right to an accounting of disclosures 
improve the detection of breaches and assists with the identification of weaknesses in privacy 
and security practices.”161  Audit logs record the activity taking place in an information-sharing 
network,162 including “queries made by users, the information accessed, information flows 
between systems, and date- and time-markers for those activities.”163  If audit logs are immutable 
and pervasively attributable to entities accessing and using information, they should seriously 
deter misuse of data.164 HITECH tries to protect patients from misuse of their health information 
by requiring the use of “audit trails” to record each instance of access to a record and creating 
incentives for the use of encryption and other best practices.165 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
160 Before HITECH, 45 C.F.R. § 164.528 restricted the right to an accounting of disclosures by exempting 
disclosures that were “to carry out treatment, payment and health care operations.”  45 C.F.R. § 164.528(a)(1)(i).  
HITECH removed that exception.  42 U.S.C. § 17935 (2010) (“In applying section 164.528 of title 45, Code of 
Federal Regulations, in the case that a covered entity uses or maintains an electronic health record with respect to 
protected health information. . . . the exception under paragraph (a)(1)(i) of such section shall not apply to 
disclosures through an electronic health record made by such entity of such information.”). 
161 HIPAA Privacy Rule Accounting of Disclosures Under the Health Information Technology for Economic and 
Clinical Health Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 31427 (proposed May 31, 2011) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. 164), available at 
https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2011/05/31/2011-13297/hipaa-privacy-rule-accounting-of-disclosures-
under-the-health-information-technology-for-economic#p-34 [hereinafter HIPAA Privacy Rule Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking].  See also 45 C.F.R. § 170.302 (2011) (“Record actions--record actions related to electronic health 
information in accordance with the standard specified in § 170.210(b) . . . [and] Generate audit log [by] [e]nabl[ing] 
a user to generate an audit log for a specific time period and to sort entries in the audit log according to any of the 
elements specified in the standard at 170.210(b).”); Health Information Technology: Initial Set of Standards, 
Implementation Specifications, and Certification Criteria for Electronic Health Record Technology, 75 Fed. Reg. 
44591 (July 28, 2010) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 170) (requiring that Certified EHR technology have the 
following capabilities “to, at a minimum, support eligible professionals’ and eligible hospitals’ efforts to achieve 
what had been proposed for meaningful use Stage 1 under the Medicare and Medicaid EHR Incentive Programs 
proposed rule.”); 45 C.F.R. § 170.210 (2011) (explaining “[t]he date, time, patient identification, and user 
identification must be recorded when electronic health information is created, modified, accessed or deleted; and an 
indication of which action(s) occurred and by whom must also be recorded.”). 
162  Criminal Intelligence Systems Operating Policies, 28 C.F.R. § 23 (2012). 
163 MARKLE TASK FORCE ON NAT’L SEC. IN THE INFO. AGE, MARKLE FOUND., IMPLEMENTING A TRUSTED 
INFORMATION SHARING ENVIRONMENT: USING IMMUTABLE AUDIT LOGS TO INCREASE SECURITY, TRUST, AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY 1 (2006).  The Markle Foundation has worked on several important reports on deploying cutting 
edge information technology in agencies, including HHS.  Id. at 4. 
164 For a discussion of the importance of immutable audit logs, see Citron & Pasquale, supra note 38, at 1473 
(explaining that “immutable audit logs . . . [promote] data integrity and relevance. . . . [by] watermark[ing data] with 
its provenance, assuring attributions and verifiability of observations (much as citations help assure the validity of an 
assertion in an academic work)[and promoting] tethering and full attribution of data to allow corrections to 
propagate through the system”) (internal citations omitted).   
165 Sandra Nunn, Managing Audit Trails, 80 J. AM. HEALTH INFO. 44, 44 (2009) (Audit trails are “records with 
retention requirements.”); John W. Hill et al., A Proposed NHIN Architecture, 48 AM. BUS. L. J. 503, 517 
(“HITECH expanded the reach of HIPAA’s Privacy Rule.  Patients must now be notified when their PHI is 
disclosed or used without their authorization. HITECH closed the loophole for business associates, established 
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Some industry comments on the HITECH rulemaking have vigorously opposed 
aggressive implementation of consumer rights.166  Nevertheless, HHS has confirmed the 
importance of maintaining patients’ access to their records.  Covered entities must provide 
individuals “with access to the protected health information in the form and format requested by 
the individual, if it is readily producible in such form and format.”167  It also promoted 
individuals’ rights to determine how their records had been used by guaranteeing an accounting 
of disclosures.168 In any twelve-month period, the first accounting requested by an individual 
from a covered entity must be provided for free, within 60 days of the request (with some narrow 
exceptions).169 
2. Encryption, De-Identification, and Best Practices in an Era of Breaches 
 Part II above described some potential cutting edge applications of cloud computing to 
solve tough problems in pharmacovigilance and treatment customization.  It suggested the 
growing convergence of research and treatment functions in data-rich environments.170 Two of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
patients’ right to access and control of their PHI (including obtaining an audit trail showing all electronic 
disclosures), and prohibited companies from selling PHI without authorization.”).  The audit trail is a sine qua non 
for technological due process.  Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249, 
1305-1306 (2008) (exploring the due process implications of automated system determinations and arguing that 
technological due process requires the inclusion of audit trails into automated systems).  Nevertheless, even this 
mechanism of protection must be carefully implemented so that the audit process itself does not create its own 
potential for breaches.  See, e.g., Dom Nicastro, HIPAA Auditor Involved in Own Data Breach, HEALTHLEADERS 
MEDIA (Aug. 8, 2011), at http://www.healthleadersmedia.com/page-1/PHY-269480/HIPAA-Auditor-Involved-in-
Own-Data-Breach (firm hired to conduct audits lost an unencrypted flash drive with 4,500 patient records).   
166 McDermott, Will, & Emery, OCR’S PROPOSED REVISIONS TO ACCOUNTING FOR DISCLOSURES STANDARD 
PRODUCES STRONG OPPOSITION FROM MANY COVERED ENTITIES,  1-2 ( 2011),  available at 
http://www.mwe.com/info/news/wp1011b.pdf; Jennifer L. Edlind, HIPAA Privacy Rule Accounting of Disclosures 
(RIN 0991-AB62); Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 76 Fed. Reg. 31426 (May 31, 2011), Aug. 1, 2011, at 1 
(responding to request for comment on HIPAA Privacy Rule and Accounting of Disclosures in capacity as 
University Hospital Privacy Officer); Larry Davis, Attention: HIPAA Privacy Rule Accounting of Disclosures (RIN 
0991-AB62); Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 76 Fed. Reg. 31426 (May 31, 2011), July 21, 2011, at 3 (responding 
to request for comment on HIPAA Privacy Rule and Accounting of Disclosures in capacity as St. Bernards 
Healthcare Corporate Compliance Officer).  
167 45 C.F.R. § 164.524(c)(2). 
168 See id. § 164.528.  Such accountings must include “(i) The date of the disclosure; (ii) The name of the entity or 
person who received the protected health information and, if known, the address of such entity or person; (iii) A 
brief description of the protected health information disclosed; and (iv) A brief statement of the purpose of the 
disclosure that reasonably informs the individual of the basis for the disclosure or, in lieu of such statement, a copy 
of a written request for a disclosure under §§164.502(a)(2)(ii) or 164.512, if any.”  Id. § 164.528(b)(2). 
169 Id. § 164.528(c)(2) (“The covered entity must provide the first accounting to an individual in any 12 month 
period without charge. The covered entity may impose a reasonable, cost-based fee for each subsequent request for 
an accounting by the same individual within the 12 month period, provided that the covered entity informs the 
individual in advance of the fee and provides the individual with an opportunity to withdraw or modify the request 
for a subsequent accounting in order to avoid or reduce the fee.”).  Patients may also direct a CE to transmit a copy 
of the record to a designee, and there are limits on the fee, which cannot be more than the labor cost involved, and 
images and other linked data are to be included.  Id. 
170 Susan Wolf has done groundbreaking work on the growing importance of treatment issues in research settings, 
and vice versa, in the context of “incidental findings” during research.  Susan M. Wolf, Incidental Findings in 
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the most important issues affecting health technology policy are transparency and access.  
Regulators must decide whether to permit innovators to control data flows in order to give them 
incentives, and where such control must end in order to respect broader social concerns about 
privacy.  Individuals are justly concerned that data or specimens related to them can be used in 
ways that compromise future opportunities.  Research data may be even more sensitive than 
entries about a patient’s existing conditions and complaints, since it can include direct and 
incidental findings whose implications have not been fully considered and explored by the 
patient.171 
 
 These concerns are reflected in health privacy law; the question now is whether HIPAA 
and cognate state laws can promote optimal standards for data collection, use, analysis, and 
encryption.  Entities covered by HIPAA are restricted in their uses of health information in many 
analytic settings.172  The Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects (the “Common 
Rule”), the FDA framework of human-subject protections, and HIPAA and related regulations 
create many obligations.173  Breach notification laws encourage encryption.174   
 
 One way to reassure patients that their data will not be misused is to reduce or encrypt the 
linkage between data and its source.175  Various legal regimes have created a complex set of 
terminologies for indicating how well-linked given data is to its source.176  Evans’s account of 
the “networked” nature of pharmacogenomic discovery would help health IT policymakers grasp 
the potential of information flows, and how unharmonized legal requirements can impede 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Neuroscience Research: A Fundamental Challenge to the Structure of Bioethics and Health Law (Oxford Handbook 
of Neuroethics, Judy Illes, Barbara Sahakian, eds., Oxford University Press, 2011). 
171 See, e.g., Susan M. Wolf et. al., Managing Incidental Findings in Human Subjects Research: Analysis and 
Recommendations, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 219, 241 (2008) (noting that an incidental finding may reveal sensitive 
data the person may not want shared). 
172 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(b)(1). 
173 CARL COLEMAN ET AL., THE ETHICS AND REGULATION OF RESEARCH WITH HUMAN SUBJECTS (2005). 
174 42 U.S.C. § 17932 (2010) (“A covered entity that accesses, maintains, retains, modifies, records, stores, destroys, 
or otherwise holds, uses, or discloses unsecured protected health information…in the case of a breach . . . [must] 
notify each individual whose unsecured protected health information has been or is reasonably believed by the 
covered entity to have been, accessed, acquired, or disclosure as a result of such breach.”).  Via breach notification 
rules, HITECH encourages, but does not require, encryption, by reducing penalties for the loss of encrypted data.  
Harley Geiger, HHS Should Require the Encryption of Portable Devices to Curb Health Data Breaches, CENTER 
FOR DEMOCRACY & TECHNOLOGY (March 16, 2011), https://www.cdt.org/blogs/harley-geiger/hhs-should-require-
encryption-portable-devices-curb-health-data-breaches.  Encryption is an addressable, not a required, specification 
under the Security Rule; however, a covered entity must comply with certain requirements in declining to implement 
an addressable specification.  See 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.306(d), 164.312(a)(2), (e)(2)(ii). 
175 Geiger, supra note 174. 
176 See Joseph Conn, Data Encryption Just One Option Under Security Law, MODERNHEALTHCARE.COM,  (May 12, 
2009, 11:00 AM), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20090512/NEWS/305129979    (explaining some of 
the different levels of encryption in HIPAA, such as de-identified records compared to records with limited data 
sets).  Encryption can be an important defense against improper access.  Brian T. Horowitz, Health Care IT: 
Securing Health Care Information: 10 Ways to Defend Against Data Breaches, EWEEK.COM (Aug. 14, 2012), 
http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Health-Care-IT/Securing-Health-Care-Information-10-Ways-to-Defend-Against-Data-
Breaches-762368/?kc=rss. 
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innovation.177  Limits on access and reuse reflect valid concerns: as endless stories of breaches 
and new data uses proliferate, data subjects need more robust assurances about controlled data 
dissemination.178  As databases proliferate, the risk of re-identification of de-identified data 
through the use of information from multiple publicly-available sources increases, so that fewer 
data points are necessary to personally identify the subject of the data.  Whatever rules govern 
the emerging infrastructure of health data surveillance and sharing, they will need to be 
complemented by monitoring that seeks to detect and deter inappropriate uses of information.179  
Part IV below proposes some methods of making that monitoring more effective, such as the 
funding of technologists (such as the technologists funded by the FTC to help that agency 
develop better mobile privacy policies) and the deployment of contingency-funded contractors 
(such as the Recovery Audit Contractors (RACs) already deployed by CMS to detect and deter 
fraud and abuse) —and perhaps even, in an era of big data, the types of de-identified data that 
may eventually be re-identified.180 
 
3.  Marketing, Sale, and the Vagaries of Consent 
The Omnibus HIPAA Rule has helped clarify the obligations of CEs who want to engage 
in sale, marketing, or research uses of protected health information.181  For marketing, a CE 
needs to obtain a patient’s authorization if it receives financial remuneration in exchange for 
communicating about a health-related product or service.182 Before the communication can be 
made, the authorization must include the disclosure that the covered entity or business associate 
is receiving financial remuneration from a third party for making the communication.  There do 
appear to be important exceptions, though.  For example, communications about a drug or 
                                                          
177  Barbara Evans, Ethical and Privacy Issues in Pharmacogenomic Research, in PHARMACOGENOMICS: 
APPLICATIONS TO PATIENT CARE 325 (Howard L. McLeod et al. eds., 2d ed. 2009). 
178 U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON 
BREACHES OF UNSECURED PROTECTED HEALTH INFORMATION 1, 9-10 (2009-10), available at 
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/administrative/breachnotificationrule/breachrept.pdf. 
179 See generally Evans, supra note 177, at 313-38 (discussing the concerns and solutions regarding data flow). 
180 For recent analyses of the re-identification issue, see Felix Wu, Privacy and Utility in Data Sets, at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2031808 (Aug. 15, 2012); OCR, Guidance Regarding Methods 
for De-identification of Protected Health  Information in Accordance with the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule, at 
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/coveredentities/De-identification/hhs_deid_guidance.pdf. 
18145 C.F.R. § 164.502(a)(5)(ii)(B)(1) covers the “sale of PHI,” which is a disclosure of PHI when the covered entity 
receives direct or indirect “remuneration from or on behalf of the recipient of the PHI in exchange for the PHI.”  The 
Omnibus HIPAA Rule addressed marketing, research, fundraising, and sale of protected health information. 
182 Financial remuneration is defined as “direct or indirect payment from or on behalf of a third party whose product 
or service is being described.” 45 C.F.R. § 164.501. It appears that nonfinancial or in-kind consideration for such 
communication is not covered by the marketing rule.  See Final Omnibus HIPAA Rule Preamble, supra note 51, 78 
Fed. Reg. at 5596 (confirming “that the term ‘financial remuneration’ does not include non-financial benefits, such 
as in-kind benefits, provided to a covered entity in exchange for making a communication about a product or 
service”); id. at 5597 (noting “that non-financial or in-kind remuneration may be received by the covered entity or 
its business associate and it would not implicate the new marketing restrictions”). 
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biologic presently prescribed for a patient can be marketed if the payment is “reasonable.”  For 
sale of PHI, there is a prohibition, but there are multiple exceptions to that prohibition.183   
One key question raised here is how the consent and authorization for the use or 
disclosure of PHI for marketing and sales purposes are to be arranged.184 A scope of 
authorization for subsidized communications can be broader than for merely a “single product or 
service or the products or services of one third party.”185  The preamble to the Omnibus HIPAA 
Rule notes that the new authorization rules “provide covered entities with a more uniform system 
for treating all remunerated communications.”186 Furthermore, “where an individual signs an 
authorization to receive such communications, the covered entity may use and disclose the 
individual’s protected health information for the purposes of making such communications 
unless or until the individual revokes the authorization pursuant to § 164.508(a)(5).”187 Such 
statements suggest an intent to streamline authorization requests, and models of consent that are 
more blanket than specific.  
On the other hand, Marla Durben Hirsch has argued that “use of ‘free’ EHRs may 
violate” the Omnibus HIPAA Rule because of the complexity of consent required to assure 
genuine acceptance and understanding of the business and treatment relationships they imply.  
Having observed that “[p]hysicians using cloud-based electronic health records should expect to 
see more pop-up and other types of advertisements from pharmaceutical and medical device 
manufacturers,”188 Hirsch cautions that they may require onerously specific consent.189 An 
                                                          
183 These include exceptions for the sale, transfer, merger, or consolidation of all or part of a covered entity and for 
related due diligence purposes if the recipient of the PHI is or will become a Covered Entity following the sale, 
transfer or merger, and for research purposes.  Posinelli Shughart, PC, Uses and Disclosures of PHI under the Final 
Rule: Changes Related to Marketing, Research, Fundraising and the Sale of Protected Health Information and 
Other Significant Changes (Feb. 2013), available at http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/uses-and-disclosures-of-phi-
under-the-fi-55749/. 
184 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(a)(3).  Note that HHS’s generosity toward research uses of health information may lead to 
some regulatory arbitrage, as entities might recharacterize information gathering as research.  45 C.F.R. 
§164.508(b)(3)(iii) allows for compound authorizations for research, reversing an earlier policy that required study-
specific authorizations. Rachel Grunberger, HITECH Update #4: HHS Relaxes HIPAA Requirements for Research 
Authorizations, COVINGTON & BURLING LLP, INSIDE PRIVACY (Jan. 20, 2013), 
http://www.insideprivacy.com/health-privacy/hitech-update-4-hhs-relaxes-hipaa-requirements-for-research-
authorizations/.   
185 Final Omnibus HIPAA Rule Preamble, supra note 51, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5566, 5596. 
186 Id. 
187 Id.  
188 Marla Durben Hirsch, EHRs the Latest Advertising Billboard for Manufacturers (Jan. 23, 2013), 
http://www.fierceemr.com/story/ehrs-latest-advertising-billboard-manufacturers/2013-01-23. 
189Marla Durben Hirsch, Use of ‘Free’ EHRs May Violate New HIPAA Rule, http://www.fierceemr.com/story/use-
free-ehrs-may-violate-new-hipaa-megarule/2013-01-29 (“[HIPAA now] requires providers to obtain patient 
authorizations ‘for all treatment and healthcare operations communications where the covered entity receives 
financial remuneration for making the communications for a third party whose product or service is being 
marketed.’ . . . The megarule doesn't specifically address pop up ads in EHRs. But the purpose of the ads is to 
market their products to physicians with the hope that they will prescribe, promote or sell them to patients. That 
sounds just like the marketing that the megarule is addressing. If the physician then ‘communicates’ the product or 
service in the ad without having patient authorization to do so, the physician is in violation of HIPAA.”). 
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insightful commentator observes that entirely ad-based EHR business models may not run afoul 
of marketing restrictions, but could be violating rules on sales of data if “the free EHR is 
provided to the CE ‘primarily’ in exchange for the PHI to be entered into the EHR.”190  The faint 
distinctions between some uses of PHI for marketing and sales purposes (and potential 
regulatory arbitrage via mere “access” to data) merit further guidance.  
There is a tension between guidance cautioning that authorization be clear and prominent, 
and cost-containment pressures that will demand streamlining of authorization procedures.  
Perhaps the ideal solution will involve more granular and technically sophisticated consent 
procedures, made possible by advances in computing.191 
Such efforts will take place in the shadow of a growing First Amendment jurisprudence 
protecting data flows.  There is already a vast and growing literature on the use of observational 
data to promote medical research.192  All involved understand undue restriction of information 
flows may impede innovation and undermine public health.193 But the commercial use of data to 
market drugs and other interventions has not been adequately addressed by academics or 
governmental entities. And even as they do move on this front, the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc. has hemmed in positive action somewhat by protecting certain sales of 
information (albeit largely de-identified) as protected by the First Amendment.   That decision 
                                                          
190  David Harlow, commenting at http://www.fierceemr.com/story/use-free-ehrs-may-violate-new-hipaa-
megarule/2013-01-29 (“It appears to me that the marketing rule would be implicated only if there were a direct or 
indirect payment of money . . . . In-kind remuneration (e.g., provision of a free EHR) is excluded from the 
definition. [But] [t]he free EHR may implicate other sections of the rule . . . The limitation on sale of PHI . . .  
includes direct and indirect remuneration [whereas the limitation on marketing focuses on financial remuneration]. 
The commentary to the rule says that ‘a sale of protected health information occurs when the covered entity 
primarily is being compensated to supply data it maintains in its role as a covered entity (or business associate). 
Thus, such disclosures require the individual's authorization unless they otherwise fall within an exception at § 
164.502(a)(5)(ii)(B)(2).’ 78 Fed. Reg 5606. Those exceptions are, essentially: (i) for public health purposes, (ii) for 
research, so long as payment is limited to the sending CE's costs, (iii) for treatment and payment, (iv) in connection 
with a sale or merger of the CE, (v) to or by a BA where the CE is just paying for the BA's services, (vi) to a patient 
who requests access to his or her own PHI, (vii) as required by law or (viii) as otherwise permitted under HIPAA 
where the remuneration covers costs only. None of these exceptions seems to apply.”). 
191  P. Mork, et al., Architectures and Processes for Nationwide Patient-Centric Consent Management (2011); 
Center for Transforming Health/MITRE Corp., Meaningful Choice: Enabling Patients to Selectively Manage Access 
to Their Health Records (2011) (“MITRE’s research allows the patient to express their desired level of granular 
control; it is then up to the record holder (such as the hospital) to request the current preferences and then use them 
to package the records for the information exchange.”); Arnon Rosenthal, Digital Policies for Patient Consents: The 
Thorny (and General) Technical Challenges, MITRE Corp. (2011) (“Our project is architecting and prototyping key 
elements of a system to elicit and manage consents. All of a patient’s consent rules are to be managed in one place, 
editable over the web, and accessible by authorized record holders.”).   
192 Inst. of Med., BEYOND THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE 141 (2009) (“observational studies play in increasingly 
critical role” in research).  
193 Clayton Christensen, THE INNOVATOR’S PRESCRIPTION 14 (2007) (integrated information systems may be able to 
condense some medical research into a matter of weeks or months, rather than the years that are customary now). 
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struck down a Vermont law limiting data flows, despite documented concerns about the 
interaction between, say, doctors and pharmacies in the brave new world of health informatics.194   
4.  Are Non-Covered Entities Creating Medical Reputations? 
 Assume, for now, that all the issues raised above are adequately addressed by regulators 
and stakeholders. Individuals would still be right to worry that their medical reputations—if not 
their medical records—are being created in processes which they can barely control or 
understand.  As Nicolas Terry has explained, judgments about individuals’ health status do not 
need to be based on medical records:  
The health care sector and its stakeholders constitute an area 
considerably larger than the HIPAA-regulated zone. As a result, some 
traditional health information circulates in what may be termed a 
HIPAA-free zone. Further, the very concept of health sector specific 
regulation is flawed because health related or medically inflected data 
frequently circulates outside of the traditionally recognized health care 
sector. In both cases agreed-upon health privacy exceptionalism is 
jeopardized.195 
 
In an era of Big Data, companies do not even need to consult the “health care sector” to impute 
various medical conditions or disabilities to data subjects.  Consider, for instance, Charles 
Duhigg’s reporting on data mining by Target: the company prides itself on knowing whether 
customers are pregnant.196  ProPublica has documented data brokers’ interest in health-inflected 
data:  
Data companies can capture information about your "interests" in 
certain health conditions based on what you buy — or what you 
search for online. Datalogix has lists of people classified 
as "allergy sufferers" and "dieters." Acxiom sells data on whether 
an individual has an "online search propensity" for a certain 
"ailment or prescription."197 
According to FTC Commissioner Julie Brill, “One firm, LeadsPlease.com, reportedly sells the 
names, mailing addresses, and medication lists of people with diseases like cancer or clinical 
                                                          
194 CVS Privacy Practices Need Investigation Despite FTC Order, Pharmacist Group Says, 
18 Health L. Rep. 397 (BNA) (March 2009).  
195 Nicolas Terry, Protecting Patient Privacy in the Age of Big Data (Sept. 27, 2012), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2153269. 
196 Charles Duhigg, How Companies Learn Your Secrets, THE N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE (Feb. 16, 2012), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-habits.html?pagewanted=all. 
197 Lois Beckett, Everything We Know About What Data Brokers Know About You, PROPUBLICA, Mar. 7, 2013, 
http://www.propublica.org/article/everything-we-know-about-what-data-brokers-know-about-you.   
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depression. Another data broker, ALC Data, reportedly offers lists of consumers, their credit 
scores, and their specific ailments.”198  
It is clear that healthcare companies are also developing an interest in cognate data.199  
Consider all the sources that could collect such data: 
 
 
Image Credit: Federal Trade Commission. 
 And how far data brokers could go to combine and recombine those sources:  
                                                          
198 Julie Brill, Reclaim Your Name, Keynote Address at Computers, Freedom, and Privacy Conference, June 26, 
2013, at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/brill/130626computersfreedom.pdf.  
199 Id. (“One health insurance company recently bought data on more than three million people's consumer 
purchases in order to flag health-related actions, like purchasing plus-sized clothing, the Wall Street Journal 
reported. (The company bought purchasing information for current plan members, not as part of screening people 
for potential coverage.)”).  
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Social networks have also intensified the surveillance of health-inflected data.  But these 
platform providers enjoy a largely deregulated online environment.  As social networks 
organized around personal health records like PatientsLikeMe provide novel and powerful 
opportunities to address health issues and to form communities, they also open the door to 
frightening and manipulative uses of data by firms and governments, employers, and ranking 
intermediaries.200 
Social network profiles are sometimes less accessible than search engine results, thanks 
to passwords and privacy settings.  But many users never take steps to keep their profile private, 
and data miners have already logged details of profiles. Facebook can suddenly reset defaults, 
causing what James Grimmelmann calls “privacy lurches” to unexpectedly expose aspects of 
profiles that users once thought were only visible to themselves and friends. Many users fail to 
change the default settings, effectively making that part of their life online an “open book.” 
                                                          
200 A company called Acxiom has 1,600 pieces of information about 98% of United States adults, gathered from 
thousands of sources.  ELI PARISER, THE FILTER BUBBLE 3 (2011).  At least some of them are health-indicative or 
health-predictive. Such information will only be more valuable to employers as self-insured health plans become 
more common. DAN SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION (2009); Natasha Singer, You for Sale: Mapping the 
Consumer Genome, THE N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/17/technology/acxiom-the-
quiet-giant-of-consumer-database-marketing.html?pagewanted=all.   
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Moreover, lacking “visceral notice” of the accessibility of their profiles, many users explicitly or 
implicitly assume that only their friends are seeing it (since they are usually the only group able 
to comment on postings). Very few take the basic privacy step of logging out and then trying to 
access their own account via another, “dummy” account, to see the picture of themselves that 
they are broadcasting to the world at large.   
 
What Daniel J. Solove has called the “digital person” has real consequences for the data 
subject it is connected to, however unaware the latter may be of the former.  According to a 2009 
survey, 35% of employers have decided not to hire someone on the basis of content on the 
applicant’s social media site.201  Of those who did so, 44% found the candidate’s mention of 
alcohol or drug use a “no-go” — and who is to know what types of inferences about health status 
they may have derived from such information.202  There are also legitimate worries about 
discriminatory uses of information either not covered by extant privacy or anti-discrimination 
laws or undetectable by workers.203 
Efforts to assure the fairness and accuracy of such reputation-affecting information have 
not caught up to technological advances in producing it.  For example, an investigating office 
may tailor its software to assure that the most damaging information available about a person 
(from its perspective) comes up first in whatever databases it queries.204 The applicant would 
need to use the same personalizing software to be fully aware of all the negative information 
such a search was generating.  Yet trade secrecy and contracts will likely prevent him from ever 
accessing an exact replica of the programs used by the educators, employers, landlords, bankers, 
and others making vital decisions about his future.  Some digital scarlet letter could be floating in 
the ether, prominent to those with certain filtering programs, and virtually invisible to others. 
  
The cost of information storage has consistently declined over time, and recent 
developments suggest even more dramatic advances toward “total recall” by computerized 
networks.205  As privacy expert Helen Nissenbaum has observed, “anything about an individual 
                                                          
201 CareerBuilders, Forty-Five Percent of Employers Use Social Networking Sites to Research Job Candidates, 
CareerBuilder Survey Finds (Aug. 19, 2009), 
http://www.careerbuilder.com/share/aboutus/pressreleasesdetail.aspx?id=pr519&sd=8/19/2009&ed=12/31/2009&sit
eid=cbpr&sc_cmp1=cb_pr519_&cbRecursionCnt=1&cbsid=8412d5b32ef54ce6854a035cf3a59d12-303995843-x3-
6. Sites included not only personal ones, like Facebook, but also LinkedIn.   
202 Another study found that as many as 50% of employers and 77% of job recruiters who have concerns about an 
applicant’s alcohol or drug abuse, violence, or other similar problems will use the Internet to search potential 
applicants. Richard A. Paul & Lisa Hird Chung, Brave New Cyberworld: The Employer’s Legal Guide to the 
Interactive Internet, 24 LAB. LAW. 109, 116 (2008-2009). 
203 Sharona Hoffman, Employing E-Health: The Impact of Electronic Health Records on the Workplace, 19 KAN. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 409, 422 (2010) (raising the possibility of a growing use of “complex scoring algorithms based 
on EHRs to determine which individuals are likely to be high-risk and high-cost workers”). 
204  For fuller explanation of these technologies, see Frank Pasquale, Reputation Regulation, in THE OFFENSIVE 
INTERNET 111 (Martha Nussbaum & Saul Levmore, eds., 2010). 
205  Victor Mayer-Schonberger, DELETE (2009).   
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that can be rendered in digital form can be stored over indefinitely long periods and be readily 
retrieved.”206 Joseph Turow’s book, The Daily You, describes in great detail the kinds of profiles 
that can result from the endless search for data.207  Social networks can both generate and use 
such data to create secret profiles.  Those profiles, in turn, may be of interest to far more than 
advertisers. Police and other officials need little more than a subpoena to review such files.208 
Data brokers are keen to monetize their information trove. 
 
Health-inflected information from entities not covered as either CEs or BAs under 
HIPAA can be a critical source of correlations, profiles, and attributions. Companies are not shy 
about using and distributing the information; for example, PatientsLikeMe.com states “you 
should expect that every piece of information you submit (even if it is not currently displayed) 
may be shared with our partners and any member of PatientsLikeMe.”209  Users were later 
shocked to find that “Nielsen Co., [a] media-research firm . . . was ‘scraping,’ or copying, every 
single message off PatientsLikeMe's private online forums.”210 Had the virtual break-in not been 
detected, health attributes connected to usernames (which, in turn, often can be linked to real 
identities) could have spread into numerous databases.   
 
For those in the individual insurance market, the risk of runaway health data has already 
been realized.  Patients who purchased antidepressants were later denied insurance repeatedly, 
thanks to a dossier sold to insurers.  Consider, for instance, the plight of Walter and Paula 
Shelton, a Louisiana couple who sought insurance while in their fifties.211  Paula had taken an 
antidepressant as a sleep aid, and occasionally used a blood pressure medication to relieve some 
swelling in her ankles. Humana, a large insurer based in Kentucky, refused to insure the couple 
based on that prescription history. They were not able to find insurance from other carriers, 
either.212  No one had explained to them that a few prescriptions could render them uninsurable.  
                                                          
206  Helen Nissenbaum, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT 36 (2008); Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual 
Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REV. 119, 129 (2004).  
207  Joseph Turow, THE DAILY YOU (2011) (describing online internet advertising markets for data). 
208 Chris Hoofnagle, Big Brother's Little Helpers: How ChoicePoint and Other Commercial Data Brokers Collect, 
Process, and Package Your Data for Law Enforcement, 29 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 595 (Summer 2004). 
209 PatientsLikeMe FAQ, http://www.patientslikeme.com/help/faq/Corporate (“Except for the restricted personal 
information you entered when registering for the site, you should expect that every piece of information you submit 
(even if it is not currently displayed) may be shared with our partners and any member of PatientsLikeMe, including 
other patients.”).   
210 Julia Angwin & Steve Stecklow, 'Scrapers' Dig Deep for Data on Web, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (Oct. 11, 
2010, 9:30 p.m. ET), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703358504575544381288117888.html. 
211 Terhune, supra note 156 (“Two-thirds of all health insurers are using prescription data--not only to deny 
coverage to individuals and families but also to charge some customers higher premiums or exclude certain medical 
conditions from policies, according to agents and others in the industry.”). 
212 Uninsured people like the Sheltons can count on some help from the Affordable Care Act, the landmark 
legislation passed in 2010. That law will require insurers to guarantee issue of policies. They can still charge people 
in their 50s three times as much as they charge those in their 20s, but those with a prescription history will not have 
to worry about flat rejections.   PPACA sec. 1201(4), § 2702(a)–(b)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-1(a)–(b)(1) (West 
Supp. 1A 2010) (requiring acceptance of all applicants, but allowing limitation to certain “open or special 
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Indeed, the model for blackballing them may still have been a gleam in an entrepreneur’s eye 
when Mrs. Shelton obtained her drugs.  It became a big business: prescription-reporting service 
Intelliscript claimed in 2008 that clients using it reported “financial returns of 5:1, 10:1, even 
20:1.”    
 
According to BusinessWeek's Chad Terhune, who first reported on the Sheltons, use of 
prescription data has been widespread in the individual insurance market.213  Insurers tailored 
policies to exclude pre-existing conditions, or to charge some members more.  Companies like 
MedPoint and Intelliscript gathered millions of records from pharmacies, avoiding privacy 
restrictions on hospital and physician records.214  They then sold them on to insurers eager to 
gain a competitive advantage by avoiding the sick.  Since 1% of patients account for over one 
fifth of healthcare costs, and 5% account for nearly half of costs, an insurer who can “cherry 
pick” the healthy and “lemon drop” the sick will be far more profitable than those who take all 
comers.215 Even though PPACA’s guaranteed issue provisions and exchanges will help deter 
such underwriting practices, it is by no means clear that health reform can address all the varied 
ways in which insurers can try to shift high-risk individuals to undesirable plans, or self-insured 
employers can adopt pretextual tactics to drive them away as employees.  
 
The FTC is supposed to deter “unfair and deceptive” trade practices, particularly those 
that can harm consumer reputations.  The FTC determined that MedPoint and Intelliscript had 
violated the law by keeping their systems secret from consumers. But the agency imposed no 
penalties, and its judgment against them barely put a dent in their business practices. The FTC 
merely required that the prescription data brokers tell consumers if their file caused a denial of 
coverage or other adverse action. There is no privacy here, just a chance at ensuring accuracy: all 
the consumer can do in response is review the record and try to correct it if it is wrong.216   
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
enrollment” periods); PPACA sec. 1201, § 2701(a)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg(a)(1)(A) (permitting 3 to 1 age-
based pricing differentials).  They will, however, want to think about how data brokers’ other forms of 
categorization may inform other, subtler forms of risk selection by employers and insurers. 
213  Terhune, supra note 156. 
214 Intelliscript Complaint, http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0623189/080212complaint.pdf.  Less harmful uses of the 
information may also be troubling to consumers, or may end up going beyond their original purposes.  See, for 
instance, concerns raised in Weld v. CVS Pharmacy (pharmacy sold names and contact information of customers to 
allow a direct marketer to target customers with specific medical conditions).   
215 Statistics are from the Agency for HealthCare Research and Quality, or AHRQ.   
216 Agreement Containing Consent Order (Milliman/Intelliscript), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0623189/2070917agree0623189.pdf; Decision and Order (Milliman/Intelliscript), 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0623189/080212do.pdf; Analysis of Proposed Consent Order to Aid Public 
Comment, http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0623189/2070917analysis0623189.pdf; Notice in Federal Register,  
http://www.ftc.gov/os/fedreg/2007/september/070928milliman.pdf; Intelliscript Complaint, 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0623189/080212complaint.pdf; Medpoint Agreement Containing Consent Order, 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0623190/070917agree0623190.pdf. 
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Meanwhile, data brokers quietly continue gathering information, and making predictions 
based on it.217 MedPoint and Intelliscript developed methods of estimating the likely cost of 
claims of an insured person, expressed as a numerical score.  That opinion could be very 
valuable to lenders, employers, and just about any other entity with a stake in a person’s future.  
But the companies are under no obligation to disclose how it is computed.  It is numbers like 
these, and concomitant risk assessments and denials of opportunity that will matter to the 21st 
century health data subject just as much as opportunities to track and understand health data 
flows. 
 
For about half of American workers, their employers bear some direct financial risk 
should they become ill.218  Whatever their ethical commitments, data-driven managers will be 
forced by market demands to try to avoid the productivity drag of a sick or otherwise impaired 
workforce, unless very strong laws and enforcement penalties deter such behavior. Sharona 
Hoffman has predicted the growing use of “complex scoring algorithms based on electronic 
health records to determine which individuals are likely to be high-risk and high-cost 
workers.”219  These methods are already used in life insurance.220  Moreover, companies can skip 
covered health records altogether and use other medically inflected data to predict an employee’s 
overall vitality or productivity.  For example, a wide waist, or multiple visits to the Coca Cola 
websites, could reflect a predisposition to diabetes.  While anti-discrimination laws militate 
against decisions based on such data, it is increasingly difficult for those affected to understand 
(let alone prove) how health-inflected data affected decision-making about them. 
 
This is in part because the amount of data gathered by third and fourth party entities is 
immense; the inferences they enable are even more staggering. Data miners need not ask a 
person directly about clothing sizes; they might merely keep track of whether he visits a “big & 
                                                          
217 Sarah Ludington, supra note 156, at 162.  There are also legitimate worries about discriminatory uses of 
information either not covered by extant privacy or anti-discrimination laws, or undetectable by workers.  Hoffman, 
Employing E-Health, supra note 203, 422 (raising the possibility of a growing use of “complex scoring algorithms 
based on EHRs to determine which individuals are likely to be high-risk and high-cost workers.”). 
218 As Ann Marie Marciarille observes, “an estimated 59% of private sector workers with health coverage are 
enrolled in self-insured plans (up from 41% in 1998).”  Marciarille, Self-Insurance Among Small Employers Under 
the ACA, Missouri State of Mind, at http://delong.typepad.com/annmariemarciarille/2013/02/self-insurance-by-
small-employers-under-the-aca.html, Feb. 18, 2013.  Self-insured status has become popular for many reasons; for 
example, the self-insured employer can more easily avoid state insurance regulation because of ERISA preemption.  
Furrow et al., HEALTH LAW (Rev. 6th Ed., 2008). Though many of these companies buy stop-loss insurance to 
mitigate their own risks, even if they are very well-insured in that respect, productivity losses due to illness (and 
particularly chronic illness) are well-documented.     
219  Hoffman, Employing E-Health, supra note 156, at 422. 
220 Frank Pasquale, Online Health Data in Employers’ and Insurers’ Predictive Analytics, CONCURRING OPINIONS, 
Nov. 19, 2010, http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2010/11/online-health-data-in-employers-and-insurers-
predictive-analytics.html (“Did you know that buying generics instead of brands could hurt your credit? Or that a 
subscription to Hang Gliding Monthly could scare off life insurers? Or that certain employers’ access to electronic 
health records could lead them to classify you as “high-risk” or “high-cost”?”). 
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tall” clothing store, on- or offline.221 So many online activities have some implications about a 
person’s health status that access to medical records is not necessary to construct a medical 
reputation.222  Harvest enough data about the food consumers buy, how often they go to the gym, 
the size of their clothing, their educational attainment and interests, and “big data” mavens will 
be happy to predict their likely health outcomes.  
 
 After the FTC’s intervention, consumers should be able to locate and correct errant 
pharmacy record files now.  But consumer protection agencies have nowhere near the staff they 
would need to monitor all companies trafficking in reputational data.  Unattributed data sources 
are used to make critical judgments about individuals.223 
 
IV.  Recommendations 
A. Increasing Business Associate Compliance: Mandatory Business Associate 
Agreement Terms, Education, and Increased Enforcement 
 
Although the Omnibus HIPAA Rule gives teeth to HIPAA by extending liability down 
the chain, many cloud service providers seem unwilling or unable to accept the implications of 
HHS’s enforcement authority.  This issue should be a priority for regulators, particularly as they 
implement audits for CEs and BAs,224 and consider expanding the program.225  
A chorus of legal advisories agrees that the Omnibus HIPAA Rule reaches many cloud 
service providers.  David Holtzman of OCR’s Health Information Privacy Division, for example, 
has warned CEs, “’If you use a cloud service, it should be your business associate.  If they refuse 
                                                          
221 See Duhigg, supra note  196 (“Almost every major retailer, from grocery chains to investment banks to the U.S. 
Postal Service, has a “predictive analytics” department devoted to understanding not just consumers’ shopping 
habits but also their personal habits, so as to more efficiently market to them.”).  
222 Just as life insurers dig into subscription records to find out if an applicant subscribes to Hang Gliding Monthly 
or Cigar Aficionado, employers are going to want to know more intimate details of employees’ lives, especially as 
the cost of data and its analysis declines. 
223 Frank Pasquale, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: TECHNOLOGIES OF REPUTATION, SEARCH, AND FINANCE (under contract with 
Harvard University Press; forthcoming, 2014). 
224 Audit authority is described at 42 U.S.C. § 17940 (2009) (“The Secretary shall provide for periodic audits to 
ensure that covered entities and business associates that are subject to the requirements of this subtitle and subparts 
C and E of part 164 of title 45, Code of Federal Regulations, as such provisions are in effect as of the date of 
enactment of this Act, comply with such requirements”).  To monitor covered entities to assure they are complying 
by HIPAA requirements, OCR launched an audit program in November 2011 as part of its health information 
privacy and security compliance program.  
225 Business associates were “immune from audit selection during the 2012 pilot phase, but this is expected to 
change should OCR expand the program in 2013, as HITECH explicitly subjects business associates to the HIPAA 
audits as well.”  Richard B. Wagner, Early Results from New HIPAA Audit Pilot Reveal Emphasis on Policy 
Documentation and Business Associate Agreements, ABA HEALTH eSOURCE, May, 2012, available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/newsletter/publications/aba_health_esource_home/aba_health_law_esource_0512_wag
ner.html.   
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to sign a business associate agreement, don’t use the cloud service.”226  Advice abounds as to 
what BAAs with cloud service providers should include to minimize risks of HIPAA liability 
and ensure HIPAA compliance, such as elements to permit a risk assessment and risk 
management process.227 
Yet some of the most powerful cloud service providers refuse to execute BAAs with CEs 
or BAs.  Amazon, for example, reportedly has “taken the position that it is not required to sign 
BAAs with companies that run HIPAA applications and/or permanently store PHI on [Amazon 
Web Services].”228  Art Gross has represented that cloud service providers Google, Yahoo, and 
AOL are not willing to sign a BAA with a CE.229  There are reports that many cloud service 
                                                          
226 Spencer & Wagner, supra note 145; see also Art Gross, HIPAA Omnibus and Microsoft Office 365 (Feb. 16, 
2013), http://www.hipaasecurenow.com/index.php/hipaa-omnibus-and-microsoft-office-365/ (“If the CE is using 
Cloud Providers such as Google, Yahoo or AOL and they are sending PHI, then the Cloud Provider would be 
considered a HIPAA Business Associate. As a Business Associate, each of the Cloud Providers would be required to 
sign a HIPAA Business Associate Agreement (BAA) with the CE.”); Bianchi et al.,  supra note 57 (“OCR has made 
it clear that cloud vendors are business associates, even if they do not access PHI. This analysis is important as 
cloud-based solutions become more widespread in the health care industry.”); Attorney: HIPAA Rules Change Game 
for Cloud Companies, HEALTH DATA MANAGEMENT (March 21, 2013), 
http://www.healthdatamanagement.com/issues/21_3/Attorney-HIPAA-Rules-Change-Game-for-Cloud-Companies-
45749-1.html (“Many cloud companies have taken the view that they are not business associates under HIPAA, but 
some of them now will be . . . .  [A] company that maintains data is a BA even if it doesn't access the data. I think 
that will have implications for the cloud industry.”) (quoting Robert Belfort, partner in the health care practice at law 
firm Manatt, Phelps & Phillips). 
227 See, e.g., Spencer & Wagner, supra note 145 (itemizing what, at minimum, a HIPAA-compliant BAA between a 
CE and cloud computing entity should include “to obtain[] the operational and cost efficiencies of cloud computing, 
but, to help avoid the risk of a costly HIPAA violation”); Alex Ruoff, BNA Health IT Law & Industry Report, Data 
Security Should Be High Priority For Cloud Storage Users, White Paper Says (Jan. 7, 2013) (identifying elements 
of a proper risk assessment and risk management process what should be addressed when entering a BAA with a 
cloud vendor to mitigate liability, as outlined in a white paper by Foley & Lardner LLP); Alex Ruoff, BNA Health 
IT Law & Industry Report, OCR Could Include Cloud Provision In Forthcoming Omnibus HIPAA Rule (Jan. 7, 
2013) (describing call for guidance from Deborah Peel, founder of Patient Privacy Rights, “that highlights the 
lessons learned from the Phoenix Cardiac Surgery case while making clear that HIPAA does not prevent providers 
from moving to the cloud,” including “request for technical safeguards for cloud computing solutions, such as risk 
assessments of and auditing controls for cloud-based health information technologies; security standards that 
establish the use and disclosure of individually identifiable information stored on clouds; and requirements for cloud 
solution providers and covered entities to enter into a business associate agreement outlining the terms of use for 
health information managed by the cloud provider”); Reece Hirsch, BNA Health IT Law & Industry Report, What 
Every General Counsel Should Know About Privacy and Security: 10 Trends for 2013 (Feb. 25, 2013) (summarizing 
opinion 05/2012, guidance on cloud computing from the European Union Article 29 Working Group, advising 
“cloud customers to maximize oversight of cloud arrangements, recommending that cloud customers conduct a 
comprehensive data protection risk assessment before selecting a cloud provider . . . [and identifying] 14 specific 
issues that cloud customers should address in cloud service agreements”). 
228 rudi2001, Amazon Web Services Discussion Forums, HIPAA BAA Agreement, Omnibus Rules New As of Jan 
2013 (Feb. 6, 2013), https://forums.aws.amazon.com/thread.jspa?messageID=428426. 
229 Gross, supra note 226; see also Leyva, supra note 71 (noting that even though Google would be a business 
associate if a CE or BA uses a tool like Google Apps to store PHI, it is unlikely a company like Google would enter 
into the contract now required by the Omnibus HIPAA Rule). 
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providers do not believe that they are bound by HIPAA.230  Others may feel free to ignore 
HIPAA’s commands because enforcement seems unlikely.231 
When cloud service providers do enter contracts with CEs or BAs, they often use their 
disproportionate bargaining power to insist that their customers “enter into standard, non-
negotiable agreements,” particularly with “low value contracts and community cloud 
contracts.”232  One attorney who provides legal advice to a Fortune 100 company said that cloud 
service providers refuse to negotiate the terms of a BAA.  At best they might offer to share the 
results of a third party audit.  But such audits do not excuse the CE or BA from complying with 
HIPAA’s written contract requirement.233 
It is possible that the liability provisions in the Omnibus HIPAA Rule will convince 
resistant cloud service providers to rethink their position on BAAs since they bear direct and 
potential agency liability for subcontractor BAs under the Rule.234  For example, after radio 
silence for three weeks, Amazon on February 27, 2013 finally responded to a customer’s web 
forum inquiry about whether it was reconsidering its refusal to sign BAAs, in light of the 
Omnibus HIPAA Rule, responding that Amazon is “in the process of considering the impact of 
                                                          
230 See, e.g., Belfort et al., supra note 69 (noting that HHS’s interpretation that vendors maintaining PHI are BAs 
even when they do not require routine access to PHI appears “to impose HIPAA requirements on certain cloud 
computing companies and other data storage vendors that previously took the position they were not business 
associates”); Patrick Ouellette, HIPAA Omnibus Responsibility Focus Shift: Legal Q&A (Jan. 22, 2013), 
http://healthitsecurity.com/2013/01/22/hipaa-omnibus-responsibility-focus-shift-legal-qa/ (“Every subcontractor 
involved is going to have HIPAA Security Rule obligations and some of them may not even know it.”); Plank, 
Enforcement, Compliance, supra note 145 (“But some attorneys have worried that subcontractors, who do work 
involving protected health information, will not realize they are now covered.”); Steve Swann, Anitian Blog, 
Analysis of the HIPAA Omnibus Rule (Feb. 12, 2013), http://blog.anitian.com/?p=348 (“This means a lot of 
companies who do not think HIPAA applies to them, are now required to be HIPAA compliant.”). 
231 Of course, as discussed below, not all cloud providers refuse to execute BAAs.  Some understand and are willing 
to comply with HIPAA’s requirements, including the requirement to sign a BAA. Melissa Markey observes that 
these cloud providers, which typically qualify for federal government contracts, tend to be more expensive, but they 
are “much cheaper than a breach response.”  Notes from Melissa Markey, Esq. (on file with authors).  
232 Classen, supra note 7, at 21. 
233 U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, Health Information Privacy: FAQ (created Dec. 19, 2002; last 
updated Mar. 14, 2006), http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/faq/business_associates/237.html (“Instead of 
entering into a contract, can business associates self-certify or be certified by a third party as compliant with the 
HIPAA Privacy Rule? Answer: No. A covered entity is required to enter into a contract or other written arrangement 
with a business associate that meets the requirements at 45 CFR 164.504(e)”); see also David Kidd, What Does It 
Take to Be HIPAA-Compliant in the Cloud?, THE DATA CENTER JOURNAL (Feb. 25, 2013), 
http://www.datacenterjournal.com/it/hipaacompliant-cloud/ (“Many technology companies are announcing the 
availability of their HIPAA-compliant cloud solutions, and it is important for health-care companies to understand 
what such a solution entrails [sic]. Employing these solutions does not mean the customer is no longer responsible 
for meeting specific HIPAA requirements for their applications, data and IT infrastructure. In fact, some HIPAA 
requirements will always be the sole responsibility of the customer, not the cloud provider.”). 
234 See Proskauer, supra note 131; Plank, Enforcement, Compliance, supra note 145.  
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[the Omnibus] rule to AWS.”235 One commenter noted that “[t]his is the single show-stopping 
item that is preventing my company from moving all our infrastructure to AWS.”236 
While Amazon is considering its position, it has been reported that Microsoft will sign a 
BAA with a CE that uses the Microsoft Office 365 platform, “a cloud solution that provides 
email, instant messaging, calendaring, file and data storage, etc.”237  Perhaps this is evidence that 
the market is reacting to the liability risks made plain by the Omnibus HIPAA Rule.  If Microsoft 
starts signing BAAs, this is sure to put pressure on the market.238  Another commenter on 
Amazon’s Web Service discussion board posted that he was pursuing alternatives with a 
competitor who would enter a BAA with it because it has “a responsibility to remain 
compliant.”239  Another posted a link to Azure, whom it claimed was issuing BAAs. 240  These 
reports suggest that perhaps some of the negotiation imbalance may be starting to self-correct. 
HHS should consider how it can help this evolution progress.  Recognizing that cloud 
service providers often have a bargaining advantage vis-à-vis CEs or BAs, HHS could require 
that BAAs contain certain terms that some cloud service providers to date have resisted but that 
will enable CEs and BAs to evaluate whether cloud vendors are complying with HIPAA.  For 
example, HHS could consider requiring BAAs to include certain security provisions, such as 
requiring cloud vendors to provide an audit certification that complies with the Statement on 
Standards for Attestation Engagements (SSAE) No. 16 Service Organization Control (SOC), 
Type II, or an equivalent audit;241 a summary of the vendor’s security plan; a summary of the 
disaster response and continuity of operations plan; an executive summary of a risk assessment  
performed at least annually and potentially whenever there are significant changes to the 
computing environment and/or there are new threats or vulnerabilities identified; and access for 
the security officer of the CE or BA to speak to the security officer of the cloud vendor.242  HHS 
also could consider when it may be appropriate to require cloud vendors to grant access to its 
data center so the CE or upstream BA may examine the vendor’s physical security.  Although it 
may go too far to require cloud vendors to permit CEs or upstream BAs to conduct remote scans 
of the cloud’s system, another option is to require the cloud vendor to agree to share a high level 
                                                          
235 rudi2001, Amazon Web Services Discussion Forums, supra note 228; AWS is Amazon’s could computing 
service. 
236 Id. 
237 Gross, supra note 226. 
238 C.f. id. (“Microsoft has built a very affordable, HIPAA compliant cloud service and is clearly aiming at CEs of 
all sizes. It will be interesting to see how Google, Yahoo and AOL respond. How long Microsoft enjoys the only 
HIPAA compliant cloud service niche is still left to be seen.”). 
239 rudi2001, Amazon Web Services Discussion Forums, supra note 228. 
240 Id. 
241 For more information about SSAE 16 SOC 2, Type II audits, see Markey & Marchak, supra note 7, at 25-26.  A 
clean SSAE 16 SOC 2, Type II audit provides a useful indication that the vendor takes seriously its security 
responsibilities. 
242 See id. at 23, 33; Notes from Melissa Markey, Esq. (on file with authors); Notes from Telephone Interview of 
Melissa Markey, Esq. on May 17, 2013 (on file with authors).   
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summary of the results of a penetration scan performed by a mutually agreeable, qualified, and 
authorized pen tester, which would yield similar information regarding the security of the cloud 
vendor.243   
HHS also could consider requiring a term in the BAA to apportion liability for HIPAA 
violations in accordance with each party’s responsibility.  Several advisories have recommended 
that parties negotiate indemnification terms,244 given the exposure to direct and agency liability 
contemplated by the Omnibus HIPAA Rule.  Some vendors maintain that these terms no longer 
are appropriate because they are directly liable to HHS.  But as Melissa Markey, Esq. and 
Margaret Marchak, Esq. have pointed out, direct liability to HHS does not necessarily mean the 
CE will not be liable for a breach.245  If the cloud provider caused the breach, the CE may want 
“to require the business associate to protect the covered entity from costs and losses due to the 
failure of the business associate to comply with the agreement.”246  Despite the continued 
importance of indemnification clauses to cloud contracting, however, some CEs may lack 
sufficient bargaining power to extract (or may not know to ask for) such a clause from a cloud 
service provider.  A requirement in the BAA for the parties to apportion liability between the 
parties based on fault arguably would give each party an incentive to comply with HIPAA to 
avoid liability. Such a clause, however, would not protect the parties from enforcement by HHS 
because HITECH and the Omnibus HIPAA Rule establish the liability of CEs and BAs.247  
 HHS also can look for ways to educate the CEs and cloud service providers of HIPAA’s 
reach, requirements, and penalties in the hope of increasing compliance.  As Stephen Wu, a 
partner at Cooke Kubrick and Wu LLP, has noted, "If you don't know you're a business associate 
. . . you might not be taking all the steps you need to comply.’”248  To this end, HHS’ Office of 
Civil Rights is designing online educational resources to help healthcare organizations and BAs 
                                                          
243 See Notes from Melissa Markey, Esq. (on file with authors); Notes from Telephone Interview of Melissa Markey, 
Esq. on May 17, 2013 (on file with authors); Markey & Marchak, supra note 7, at 22-24. 
244 See, e.g., Proskauer, supra note 131 (recommending that “both covered entities and business associates should 
now consider seeking indemnification in their business associate agreements”); Anne Foster et al., supra note 138 
(“Covered entities are encouraged to shore up their business associate agreements to include indemnification 
language and consider cyber liability insurance requirements when contracting with business associates.”). 
245 Markey & Marchak, supra note 7, at 4.   
246 Id.  Ms. Markey also generally seeks to carve out HIPAA compliance from any limitations of liability in cloud 
contracts, such as disclaimers of consequential and/or punitive damages.  See Notes from Telephone Interview of 
Melissa Markey, Esq. on May 17, 2013 (on file with authors); Notes from Melissa Markey, Esq. (on file with 
authors). 
247 See, e.g., Spencer & Wagner, supra note 145 (“Although the parties can sign agreements and decide which 
entities will be financially responsible for certain activities, ‘you cannot avoid the federal government. Now that 
business associates are liable under statute, you can't have a contract that says business associates are not liable for 
anything,’ [Joy] Pritts[, chief privacy officer at the HHS Office of the National Coordinator for Health IT,] said. If 
the federal government ‘decides the business associate was the one responsible, they still have the ability to enforce 
against the business associate,’ Pritts said.”); Anne Foster et al., supra note 138 (“Business associates cannot avoid 
regulatory liability by refusing to sign a business associate agreement or limiting liability in those agreements.”). 
248 Marianne Kolbasuk McGee, HIPAA Omnibus: The Liability Chain: Expert Explains Compliance Flow (Feb. 13, 
2013), http://www.healthcareinfosecurity.com/interviews/hipaa-omnibus-liability-chain-i-1787. 
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comply with the Omnibus HIPAA Rule, which OCR intends to release on its web site around 
March 26, 2013, when the Rule is effective.249  These resources will include: a breach risk 
assessment tool to help CEs and BAs assess if notification is required; guidance to help CEs 
comply with the minimum necessary standard when dealing with BAs and others; compliance 
tools focused on helping smaller healthcare entities; modified HIPAA training for state attorneys 
general that CEs may use; and consumer materials, such as YouTube videos and multilingual 
fact sheets that explain patient rights and other aspects of the Rule.250  HHS should expand these 
planned educational efforts by developing educational materials targeted to cloud service 
providers to help them understand their responsibilities and liability exposure under HIPAA.   
 
 HHS also should work to empower CEs and upstream BAs with information about cloud 
provider liability and resources available to help them evaluate potential vendors from a security 
standpoint.  According to Melissa Markey, CEs do not always appreciate that they have 
bargaining power and options such that they can walk away from cloud vendors who refuse to 
execute BAAs or provide any information about their security practices.251  Ms. Markey and Ms. 
Marchak reject vendors’ defense that they must keep their processes confidential to maintain 
security, retorting that, “security by obscurity is not a good policy.”252  While some details of the 
security operations must remain confidential, they believe the security officers from the customer 
and vendor can share much information without jeopardizing security to “allow the customer to 
evaluate whether security is reasonable.”253  Education of all parties is critical to have 
meaningful negotiations.  
 
 CMS’s deployment of integrity contractors to address problems of errors in payments and 
claims may provide one model of education toward compliance, if Congress is willing to 
authorize and provide initial investment in more calibrated interventions to assure compliance.   
CMS has pioneered innovative deployments of private sector contractors in social welfare 
programs.  It has used “fiscal intermediaries (FIs), carriers, and durable medical equipment 
regional carriers (DMERCs) to process Part A, Part B, and durable medical equipment (DME) 
claims for reimbursement” for decades, and Quality Improvement Organizations (QIOs) to 
assess the value and effectiveness of care offered.254  The agency has also employed a wide array 
of contractors to detect and deter improper payments, sometimes funding the contractors with a 
                                                          
249 See McGee, HIPAA Omnibus Compliance, supra note 133. 
250 See id. 
251 See Notes from Telephone Interview of Melissa Markey ,Esq. on May 17, 2013 (on file with authors). 
252 Markey & Marchak, supra note 7, at 24.   
253 Id. 
254 Sara Kay Wheeler et al., Meet the Fraud Busters: Program Safeguard Contractors and Zone Program Integrity 
Contractors, 4 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 1 (2011) (citing 42 C.F.R. §§ 421.100 (FIs), 421.200 (carriers), 421.210 
(DMERCs), and describing the functions of each)); see also CENTERS FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES, 
MEDICARE PROGRAM INTEGRITY MANUAL § 1.3.6 (last updated Nov. 20, 2009); 42 C.F.R. § 421.304 (describing the 
function of Medicare Integrity Program Contractors). 
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percentage of the improper claims detected.255  Perhaps HIPAA fines could be deployed in a 
similar way, to provide a sustainable ecosystem of self-funding to expert entities capable of 
monitoring a rapidly changing technical landscape. 
  
 CMS is committed to “developing new methods and technologies to stay ahead of 
criminals and identify their patterns of behavior early” and “data analysis to identify cases of 
suspected fraud, waste and abuse.”256  The Medicare Program Integrity Manual governs 
Medicare fraud-detection contractors, along with applicable Statements of Work.257  According 
to the Manual, comprehensive error rate testing (“CERT”) contractors “establish[] error rates and 
estimates of improper payments.”258  The Recovery Audit Contractors (“RACs”) “detect and 
correct improper payments in the Medicare FFS [fee for service] program and provide 
information to CMS, [affiliated contractors] ACs  and [medicare administrative contractors] 
MACs.”259  Once these surveillance entities produce data, Medicare Administrative Contractors 
[“MACs”] can identify program vulnerabilities and develop approaches to respond to wayward 
providers.260  Their medical reviews do not have to culminate in charges or prosecutions; rather, 
“prepayment edits” and provider education are preferred in many situations.261  These 
contractors are emerging as sophisticated analysts of data.  They engage not only in reactive but 
                                                          
255 Timothy Martin, Revenue-Cycle Management and Reimbursement: The Impact of Health Law and Health 
Reform on Providers, 4 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 159 (2011) (discussing the creation and authorization of 
contractors and the methods utilized in analyzing claims); see also Mark E. Reagan & Mark A. Johnson, Taming the 
Medicaid Beast: The Federal Government’s Ambitious Attempt to Combat Medicaid Fraud, Waste, and Abuse, 3 J. 
HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 1 (2010) (explaining “the role and duties of Medicaid Integrity Contractors”). 
256 Anatomy of a Fraud Bust: From Investigation to Conviction: Hearing before the S. Comm. on Finance, 112th 
Cong. (2012) (testimony of Peter Budetti), available at http://www.hhs.gov/asl/testify/2012/04/t20120424a.html. 
257 Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, MEDICARE PROGRAM INTEGRITY MANUAL, supra note 254, § 1.1 
(“Medicare administrative contractors (MACs), comprehensive error rate testing (CERT) contractors, recovery audit 
contractors (RACs), program safeguard contractor (PSCs) and zone program integrity contractors (ZPICs) shall 
follow the PIM [Program Integrity Manual] as required by their applicable Statement of Work (SOW).”).  
258 Id § 1.3.1. (“error rates produced by the CERT program” are used to “identify where to target [] improper 
payment prevention efforts”).  A Fraud Prevention System (FPS) runs “predictive algorithms and other sophisticated 
analytics nationwide against all Medicare fee-for-service claims . . . prior to payment.”  Assessing Medicare and 
Medicaid Program Integrity: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Gov’t Org., Efficiency, & Fin. Mgmt. of the H. 
Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 112th Cong. (2012) (testimony of Peter Budetti), available at 
http://www.hhs.gov/asl/testify/2012/06/t20120607a.html. 
259 CENTERS FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES, MEDICARE PROGRAM INTEGRITY MANUAL, supra note 254, 
§ 1.3.1(C). “[I]t is difficult to prevent all improper payments, considering that more than 1 billion claims are 
processed each year. Id. To address this issue, CMS uses specialized programs to detect and correct improper 
payments and "provide information to CMS, ACs and MACs that could help protect the Medicare Trust Funds by 
preventing future improper payments.” Id.  
260 Id. at § 1.3.1.B (Medicare contractors “primarily use error rates produced by the CERT program and 
vulnerabilities identified through the RAC program to identify where to target their improper payment prevention 
efforts.”).  
261 Medical Appeals Council reviews are designed to spot errors.  The Medicare Program Integrity Manual advises 
contractors that “most errors do not represent fraud. Most errors are not acts that were committed knowingly, 
willfully, and intentionally.”  Id. § 1.3.9 (“Providers may conduct self-audits to identify coverage and coding errors" 
using the Office of Inspector General (OIG) Compliance Program Guidelines, which are available at 
http://www.oig.hhs.gov/compliance/compliance-guidance/index.asp).    
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proactive efforts to identify problems, combing records for outliers.  They can access a wide 
array of information sources.262   
 
 Truly assuring the privacy and security of data in the cloud may require intense and fine-
grained surveillance.  Just as David Ticoll and Don Tapscott predicted in 2003 that “radical 
transparency” would shake up the business world,263  CMS’s myriad contractors are motivating 
healthcare providers to modernize their practices.264    Surveillance “serves as a means, made 
possible by increasingly effective technologies of recording and preservation, to allow the 
replaying of the past in the future.”265  Moreover, monitoring and assessment critically involve 
“assertions of power over what can be seen/recorded/reduced.”266  The mere threat of intense 
assessment of interventions can increase productivity.267  Work can be performed more 
efficiently as it is recorded and studied.268  New forms of regulation depend on rapid 
accumulation of data, and auditors should not shy away from benchmarking ideals for 
continuous quality improvement at cloud service providers.269   
 
It may be possible to attribute some of cloud vendors’ deafness to HIPAA’s requirements 
to the relatively low number of enforcement actions brought against CEs and BAs.  Many 
penalty actions originate from CEs that self-reported breaches while those who flout the 
regulatory system remain untouched.  This creates a regrettable disincentive for compliance.  
HHS should exercise its power to conduct audits over cloud service providers to root out 
noncompliance and hopefully encourage a culture of compliance.   Given resource constraints 
                                                          
262 Wheeler et al., supra note 254, at 23. ZPICs can access referrals from MACs, QIOs, states’ Medicaid fraud 
control units, state licensing boards, and U.S. Attorney offices; OIG reports; beneficiary complaints; fraud alerts; 
national claims data from the Health Care Customer Information System; and National Claims Data from CMS Data 
Center’s Part B Analytics. Id. Complaints can be filed by virtually any person with “direct and independent 
information of the fraud,” including compliance officers, employees (both current and former), technologists, 
auditors, accountants, consultants, and salespersons.  Id. 
263 David Ticoll & Don Tapscott, THE NAKED CORPORATION: HOW THE AGE OF TRANSPARENCY WILL 
REVOLUTIONIZE BUSINESS 5 (2003) (describing openness as a business imperative).  
264 The Recovery Audit Contractor Program was created by the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 to recover 
Medicare overpayments under fee-for-service Medicare Plans.  In 2006, the Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006 
made the program permanent, and required implementation in all states by 2010.  During the demonstration program 
that ran from 2005 to 2008, the RAC program had identified approximately $992.7 million of improper 
overpayments for CMS.  As the authority, functions, and objectives of contractors differ, providers are advised to 
“develop unique plans for communicating and interacting with each contractor to minimize the risk of sanctions for 
alleged noncompliance.”  Wheeler et al., supra note 254, at 7.   
265 Larry Catá Backer, Global Panopticism: States, Corporations and the Governance Effects of Monitoring 
Regimes, 15 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 101, 110 (2008).  
266 Id. at 111.  
267 Id. at 112. 
268 Id. 
269 Kenneth A. Bamberger, Technologies of Compliance: Risk and Regulation in a Digital Age, 88 TEX. L. REV. 669, 
670 (2012).   
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that might limit efforts to increase Federal HIPAA enforcement, HHS also could study whether 
the States could be better incentivized to assist with HIPAA enforcement.270   
B.  Study Assessing Feasibility of Limited Safe Harbor for Covered Entities Engaged 
in Best Practices 
 
 It seems like sound policy to encourage upstream HIPAA entities to provide guidance 
and supervision to downstream entities.  There are several reasons, however, that CEs or BAs 
contracting with cloud service providers might not exercise this supervisory role. 
For one, as discussed in Section IV.A.1. above, cloud service providers enjoy strong 
bargaining power and thus sometimes demand that CEs and BAs sign form contracts.  It is 
unlikely cloud service providers will volunteer to be controlled and directed during their 
performance under the BAA, opting instead for independence and flexibility.  HHS could 
address the bargaining power disparity and encourage downstream supervision by requiring 
BAAs to include terms that preserve a monitoring role for CEs and BAs.  
Even without the bargaining imbalance, a CE or BA may be reluctant to reserve the right 
or authority to control a downstream BA’s conduct271 for fear of being held liable for the agent’s 
violations even though the CE or BA lacks any real ability to control the agent’s behavior.  HHS 
expressed its understanding in the preamble to the Omnibus HIPAA Rule that a BA could still be 
acting within the scope of agency if it deviated from the terms of the BAA by, for example, 
acting carelessly, making a mistake, or disregarding the CE or upstream BA’s specific 
instruction.272  Thus, it appears that although agency liability requires the principal to have the 
authority to control the BA’s conduct by, for example, being able to give instructions during the 
course of the agent’s performance of the service, agency liability does not necessarily lapse when 
the agent does not heed the principal’s instructions.  A CE or BA may not want to retain the 
appearance of control yet risk that it will be liable for a sloppy or perhaps even rogue agent’s 
violations.  It would be helpful for HHS to expand on its discussion in the preamble to the 
Omnibus HIPAA Rule as to when a CE or upstream BA would remain liable for the violations of 
an agent that disregards the principal’s instructions or otherwise violates the BAA.    
Moreover, given the technical complexities of cloud computing, it would be valuable for 
HHS to focus more attention on regulating cloud providers more directly.  The nascent auditing 
of BAs discussed elsewhere in this paper may provide one model.  HHS also ought to clarify to 
                                                          
270 Unfortunately, despite some notable action against an Accretive breach in Minnesota, other states have not been 
that active in utilizing newfound authority under HITECH.  Kimberley Leonard, State Attorneys General Not 
Leaping to Embrace HIPAA Enforcement, THE CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY, 
http://www.publicintegrity.org/2011/09/20/6666/state-attorneys-general-not-leaping-embrace-hipaa-enforcement.   
271 Final Omnibus HIPAA Rule Preamble, supra note 51, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5581. 
272 See id. at 5582.  But cf. id. at 5587 (“An agent that fails to notify a covered entity or business associate may be 
acting outside its scope of authority as an agent.”) 
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what extent agency liability applies in the cloud computing context. The preamble emphasizes 
that agency liability is a fact sensitive inquiry that depends on the type of service and skill level 
required to perform the service.273   HHS expressed its doubt, for example, that a small provider 
would have sufficient expertise to supervise and direct a company hired to de-identify PHI.274  It 
is unclear how this analysis applies in the cloud computing context.  It is possible that at least 
some cloud computing services require expertise CEs and upstream BAs lack such that the cloud 
service provider is not the agent of the CE or BA.  But this analysis depends on the particular 
service the cloud service provider is performing as well as the skill set and expertise of the CE or 
upstream BA.  In addition, since a CE or BA does not need to retain the right or authority to 
control every aspect of a downstream BA’s activities to create agency liability,275 perhaps HHS 
will take the position that, despite cloud expertise, CEs and BAs can and should supervise 
downstream cloud BAs at least with respect to risk management and HIPAA compliance.  CEs 
and BAs would benefit from additional guidance from HHS  regarding whether cloud service 
providers are or can be agents of CEs or upstream BAs despite potential gaps in technical 
sophistication. 
To the extent agency liability applies to cloud service provider relationships, HHS could 
study the feasibility of creating a limited safe harbor for CEs and upstream BAs who engage in 
guidance and vetting of downstream BAs.  Recognizing that HHS recently omitted from the 
Omnibus HIPAA Rule a previous exception to agency liability for CEs,276  this limited safe 
harbor could not be an end run around agency liability.  Rather, a limited safe harbor would need 
to go beyond the elements of the liability exception HHS rejected.  For example, in addition to 
complying with the pertinent BAA and HIPAA requirements and not being aware of a pattern or 
practice of the BA violating the contract, CEs and upstream BAs would need to actively engage 
in evaluating, educating, monitoring, and providing feedback to downstream BAs with the goal 
of raising awareness of and sensitivity to the need to protect PHI.  A number of the security 
provisions itemized in Section IV.A above could facilitate the vetting and monitoring HHS wants 
to encourage, such as requiring an SSAE 16 SOC, Type II audit and access to the cloud vendor’s 
security officer for technical level discussions about its security practices.277  To encourage due 
                                                          
273 Id. at 5581. 
274 Id. 
275 Id. at 5582. 
276 Id. at 5580; James Swann, supra note 63. 
277 See Markey & Marchak, supra note 7, at 23, 33. Markey & Marchak offer a useful list of questions to consider 
asking as part of the due diligence required to assess a cloud vendor’s approach to security: 
 
• What security measures are in place to protect the data center against 
unauthorized physical intrusion? 
• Who would be permitted to access my data and under what circumstances? 
• What are your procedures for terminating access to data or systems upon 
termination of an employee, or upon change of job duties? 
• What are the processes to ensure that default passwords are changed and/or 
other access controls are implemented? 
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diligence and vigilance, HHS could distinguish supervising from exercising control.  Thus, 
guidance could clarify that being more aware of how a cloud vendor approaches security and 
confirming that it has a clean audit before engaging in business with that vendor, for example, as 
distinguished from retaining control to direct vendor actions on a day-to-day basis, will not 
create agency liability.      
Alternatively, in determining how to exercise its discretion both to bring enforcement 
actions and to set penalties, HHS could issue guidance clarifying that it will take into 
consideration the relative bargaining power of the parties and the extent to which CEs or 
upstream BAs took steps to assess risks and take appropriate steps to preserve PHI.  For 
example, HHS could affirm the value of CEs and upstream BAs vetting potential vendors prior 
to contracting to evaluate their qualifications and compliance with HIPAA; using a BAA that 
includes all terms required by HHS; actively monitoring the agent’s performance; providing 
appropriate and ongoing training and instruction to cloud service providers; and responding to 
signals of possible violations.278  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
• What procedures exist to ensure configurations are properly set? 
• What does your testing/patch process include? 
• What is your encryption policy? 
• How do you secure transmissions outside your network? 
• Where will the data be stored? In the United States or other countries? 
• Does the cloud provider: 
o Have cyber-insurance? 
o Have an audit certification of their information security program in 
compliance with the Statement on Standards for Attestation 
Engagements (SSAE) No. 16 Service Organization Control (SOC) 
2 or 3, or equivalent audit (e.g. ISO 27001/2)? 
o Conduct (at a minimum) quarterly vulnerability scans and annual 
network penetration tests? 
o Use security monitoring and event log management to ensure the 
collection and secure storage of audit trails? 
o Review event logs periodically for anomalies?  
o Document changes following industry standard practices for 
configuration management and change control? 
o Employ redundant hardware components, load-balanced Internet 
connections with multiple service providers, and functioning 
firewalls? 
o Implement backup options and encrypt any removable or portable 
backup media? 
o Conduct business continuity and disaster recovery exercises on a 
regular, planned basis?  
 
Markey & Marchak, supra note 7, at 22-24. 
278 Cf. generally Dep’t of Just. & U.S. Sec. & Exchange Comm’n, A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act, 57-62 (Nov. 14, 2012),  http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/fcpa-resource-guide.pdf (itemizing ten 
hallmarks of effective compliance programs that DOJ and SEC take into consideration in deciding whether to take 
enforcement action against a company and what penalty to impose: commitment from senior management and 
clearly articulated policy against corruption; code of conduct and compliance policies and procedures; oversight, 
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C.  Increasing Patient Empowerment: From Transparency to Intelligibility to 
Accountability 
 
Expanding access to personal information is part of a larger movement to hold corporate 
actors accountable in an era of rapidly declining data storage costs.  Asked about privacy 
practices, Google’s former CEO Eric Schmidt once said, “[W]e like to get right up to the creepy 
line, but not cross it.”279  But it would probably be more accurate to say that he and other 
corporate leaders don’t want to be caught crossing the creepy line.  Law and technology provide 
a rich variety of tactics to avoid that possibility.  Accountings of disclosures should provide a 
persistent record of data use that should deter at least some privacy violations.280 
Many aspects of the Omnibus HIPAA Rule are aimed at assuring that patients are able to 
understand (and control some) aspects of the data kept about them by CEs and BAs.  While the 
Rule makes several steps in the right direction, it does not reflect a full appreciation of the levels 
of complexity in data flows occasioned by technological advance.  Standards and best practices 
still need to be adopted by the larger cloud computing community to assure optimal realization 
of these rights.  For example, how well can records interact with visualizations like Collusion or 
The Data Map?281  Fuller interoperability and more open API’s will be necessary in order to 
empower consumers to fully understand how data flows, and how those flows influence their 
opportunities.  
Nor did Congress adequately appreciate, in HITECH, the degree to which big data 
companies’ use of health-inflected data could eventually render HIPAA irrelevant by fueling the 
creation of medical reputations unmoored from covered medical records.  In order to address 
these 21st century challenges to health privacy, policymakers should take two steps: rendering 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
autonomy, and resources; risk assessment; training and continuing advice; incentives and disciplinary measures; 
third party due diligence and payments; confidential reporting and internal investigation; continuous improvement: 
periodic testing and review; mergers and acquisitions: pre-acquisition due diligence and post-acquisition 
integration).  
279 Derek Thompson, Google’s CEO: ‘The Laws Are Written by Lobbyists,’ ATLANTIC ONLINE (Oct. 1, 2010, 11:58 
AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2010/10/googles-ceo-the-laws-are-written-by-
lobbyists/63908/. 
280 See HIPAA Privacy Rule Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 161 (pointing out that audit trails 
“discourage inappropriate behavior”). 
281 Gary Kovacs has promoted Collusion as an app to track app data sharing; Latanya Sweeney has focused “The 
Data Map” on health issues. Latanya Sweeney, The Data Map, available at http://thedatamap.org/intro.html (“When 
you visit a doctor, you expect some organizations to receive information about your visit (e.g., your medical 
insurance company and your pharmacy), but you might be surprised and not even recognize many of the other 
entities who may also receive identifiable information about your visit (e.g., a data mining company, your employer, 
your state government). If you then suffer an economic harm or discrimination as a result of the hidden sharing, you 
would not know the information was used against you, and if the information was incorrect, you could offer no 
correction. If a data breach occurs, you would not know your information was stolen because you would have no 
reason to believe your information was being held by the breached company, yet you could be the victim of identity 
theft or medical identity theft as a result.”).   
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existing data about information practices more intelligible to consumers, and presenting in plain 
terms to Congress the types of privacy challenges enabled by the deployment of big data. 
Over a decade ago, Bill Sage complained that both supporters and critics of information-
based regulation in healthcare “have overlooked serious operational issues and misunderstood 
some of the best uses of information.”282  Sage argued that disclosure must be “properly 
designed and implemented” to improve outcomes, and he worried that the disclosure movement 
of the 1990’s was ill-equipped to provide actionable information to patients and providers.283  
Sage’s concerns appear especially relevant in the realm of health privacy, where the proliferation 
of entities with some interest in and access to health records is far outpacing the ability of 
conventional notices and written descriptions to convey information to patients. 
 As HHS continues clarifying the implications of the Omnibus HIPAA Rule, it should 
focus on moving from transparency to intelligibility in health data.  Rather than merely opening 
up presently maintained information, policymakers need to focus on promoting the types of  
standards and analysis that can make that data actionable.  This will require careful collaboration 
between regulators, technical experts, and data visualization and design experts who have studied 
optimal communication strategies. 
 
 The President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (“PCAST”) warned in 
2010 against health information technology adoption uninspired by a vision for data use and 
sharing that would allow healthcare to enjoy the quality and efficiency gains characteristic of 
information industries.284  It is now time to take the next step and consider how high technology 
approaches could also promote privacy in healthcare. In this respect, the Federal Trade 
Commission, often seen as the lead privacy regulator in the U.S. (and an entity with some role in 
health privacy, given its statutory authority to regulate personal health records), offers both 
lessons and a cautionary tale. 
 
 Realizing how quickly the world of online data collection is moving, the FTC has taken 
important steps to monitor evolving business practices.  The agency appointed Ed Felten as 
“Chief Technologist,” and has also employed highly regarded privacy experts like Paul Ohm and 
Christopher Soghoian. Soghoian and Felten have extensive experience in computer science; Ohm 
combines computer science training with legal expertise.  Each of these individuals has done a 
great deal to help the agency apply expertise to current problems in privacy.  Moreover, the 
agency’s report, Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change: Recommendations 
for Businesses and Policymakers, was a model of sensitive appreciation of stakeholder concerns, 
leading to guidance on some best practices for digital companies.   
                                                          
282 William M. Sage, Regulating Through Information: Disclosure Laws and American Health Care, 99 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1701, 1710 (1999). 
283 Id. 
284 PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., supra note 28, at 14. 
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 This perceptive, well-written report grappled with fundamental issues in the law of fair 
data practices and consumer protection. Where the law was plainly inadequate, the report said so. 
For example, it supported "legislation that would provide consumers with access to information 
held by data brokers," an increasingly important priority in a pervasively scored society.285  The 
FTC’s December 2012 subpoena of leading data brokers indicates an interest in illuminating 
some of the darker corners of data collection, analysis, sharing, and use.  The FTC’s commitment 
to technical personnel and cutting edge reports is something of a model for other agencies tasked 
with protecting privacy in an era of rapid change. 
 
 Nevertheless, there are also faults in the FTC’s approach.  Peter Maass’s investigative 
report for ProPublica called the agency hopelessly outmatched in terms of staffing, vis-à-vis the 
extraordinary proliferation of data-driven business models it is ostensibly policing.286   Echoing 
the 1968 Nader Report on the FTC, Maass described the near-heroic (but ultimately doomed) 
efforts of a chronically underfunded entity to keep up with privacy threats in the new economy.  
Sadly, top officials at the agency were more defensive than supportive of Maass’s 
characterization of the impossible task Congress had set for them, given the resources allocated 
to it.  Where its technical capacity is clearly lacking, it should say so. And it should not be afraid 
to ask Congress for the resources it needs to detect lawbreaking. This might include a self-
funding agency model, like the Patent and Trademark Office, the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau, or the FDIC.287 Or it could ask for authorization to hire contractors to discover 
wrongdoing, paying them on a contingency basis.  All of these approaches should be considered 
by agencies tasked with protecting health privacy, lest their mission shrink to fit whatever 
inadequate resources happen to be allocated to them in any particular budget cycle. 
 
V.  Conclusion 
There are multiple uses (and misuses) of health information compiled about patients, 
insureds, research subjects, physicians, hospitals, and populations.   Privacy law has focused on 
                                                          
285 Applying the Fair Credit Reporting Act, the FTC itself required firms that “score” the health status of individuals 
based on their pharmacy records to disclose these records to scored individuals.  
286 Peter Maass, Your FTC Privacy Watchdogs: Low-tech, Defensive, Toothless, ProPublica/Wired Joint Publication 
(June 28, 2012), available at http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/06/ftc-fail/all/ (“The mismatch between FTC 
aspirations and abilities is exemplified by its Mobile Technology Unit, created earlier this year to oversee the 
exploding mobile phone sector. The six-person unit consists of a paralegal, a program specialist, two attorneys, a 
technologist and its director, Patricia Poss. For the FTC, the unit represents an important allocation of resources to 
protect the privacy rights of more than 100 million smartphone owners in America. For Silicon Valley, a six-person 
team is barely a garage startup. Earlier this year, the unit issued a highly publicized report on mobile apps for kids; 
its conclusion was reflected in the subtitle, ‘Current Privacy Disclosures Are Disappointing.’  It was a thin report, 
however. Rather than actually checking the personal data accessed by the report’s sampling of 400 apps, the [17 
page] report just looked at whether the apps disclose, on the sites where they are sold, the types of personal data that 
would be accessed and what the data would be used for.”).    
287 For a description of the self-funding model, see Juliana Gruenwald, SEC Chief Backs Self-Funding, GOV’T 
EXEC., Mar. 17, 2010, http://www.govexec.com/oversight/2010/03/sec-chief-backs-self-funding/31076/.  
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assuring the confidentiality, security, and accuracy of health information. The post-HITECH 
landscape will increasingly balance these concerns with the goals of innovation, access, and cost-
control.   
 
A new body of law—health information law—is becoming a distinctive field.  Just as 
intellectual property (IP) law adapted property law principles to new economic phenomena, and 
privacy law extended tort and contract law principles into the intangible realm of reputation, now 
health information law is emerging to combine IP, privacy, and administrative principles in the 
high-stakes healthcare context. 
  
Advanced information technology has raised a number of new questions.  Beyond 
HIPAA and HITECH regulation, consumer protection law plays an important role in these 
fields.  Patients are opting to personalize their health records with the help of cloud computing 
firms; what law governs this digital migration? There is increasing concern about the role of 
“incidental findings” in medical research; how will regulators and professional groups address 
them?   When employers demand access to employee health records, in what ways can they use 
them to profile the employee? Should law limit the development of “medical reputations” about 
individuals, even if they are not based on protected health records?  What are the proper 
tradeoffs between data privacy, security, portability, integrity, and accuracy?  
 
 The networked health IT of cloud computing will raise all these questions and more as it 
attempts to bring the productivity gains characteristic of information industries to healthcare.  
But its systems need to be designed to protect the integrity and security of protected health 
information. 
  
  The laws governing the management of healthcare information are extremely complex.  
Some of this complexity is necessary to the subject matter.  However, it should not obscure the 
larger goals of health information law.  This white paper has recommended some steps forward 
to assure that the interests of patients are front and center as health data collection enters a new 
and qualitatively different era of promise and peril.  Both covered entities and their cloud service 
providers should be held to high standards by technologies of compliance as precise and 
persistent as the practices they aim to monitor and improve.  If medical reputations are being 
created with data outside the bounds of present HIPAA and HITECH regulation, HHS needs to 
study these processes and acknowledge the limits of present models of privacy protection. 
Finally, regulation needs to assure that responsibility for protecting the privacy and security of 
data rests with the correct entity, be it a covered entity or business associate.  The Omnibus 
HIPAA Rule released in January 2013 is a major step forward for health privacy, but more work 
remains to be done to assure a regulatory framework up to the challenges generated for privacy 
and security generated by cloud computing technologies.   
 
